Double, Double Toil and Trouble:  Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-Decade by Malloy, Michael P.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 6 Article 3 
1995 
Double, Double Toil and Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-
Decade 
Michael P. Malloy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael P. Malloy, Double, Double Toil and Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-Decade, 63 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2031 (1995). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
DOUBLE, DOUBLE TOIL AND TROUBLE:
BANK REGULATORY POLICY
AT M1D-DECADE*
Michael P. Malloy**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 2032
I. DOUBLED OVER: FIRREA AND THE CRISIS IN BANK
REGULATORY POLICY .................................... 2033
A. The Regulatory Environment ........................ 2034
B. Organization of New Depository Institutions ......... 2039
C. Management of Depository Institutions .............. 2040
D. Exercise of Control ....... ................. 2042
E. Capital Adequacy Supervision ....................... 2042
F. Holding Company Supervision ....................... 2043
G. Mergers and Acquisitions ............................ 2044
H. Conversions ......................................... 2044
i. DOUBLE OR NOTHING: FDICIA AND BANK
SUPERVISION ............................................. 2046
A. The Treasury Modernization Study and the State of
Play in Bank Regulatory Policy ..................... 2046
1. The Crisis in the Bank Regulatory System ...... 2047
2. The Deposit Insurance System ................... 2048
3. Increased Supervision of Management of
Depository Institutions .......................... 2050
4. Increased Supervision of Capital as a Source of
Strength ......................................... 2050
5. Securities Activities of Depository Institutions . 2052
6. Holding Company Activities ..................... 2053
B. FDICIA's Narrow Response ......................... 2053
1. FDIC and RTC Resources ...................... 2054
2. Improved Supervision ........................... 2054
3. Supervision of Failing Institutions ............... 2057
4. Mergers and Acquisitions ........................ 2057
Im. DOUBLING UP: INTERSTATE BANKING ................... 2058
* Copyright © 1994 Michael P. Malloy. Portions of this Article will appear in
the 1995 Cumulative Supplement No. 1 to Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and
Regulation (1994). This Article is a longer version of a presentation made before the
Graduate Colloquium, Fordham University School of Law, on November 3, 1994.
The author wishes to thank the staff of the Graduate Program, Fordharn University
School of Law, and especially Mrs. Estelle Fabian, Associate Director
(Administration and Planning), who made the work on this Article possible.
** Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University
School of Law; B.A., Georgetown University (1973); J.D., University of Pennsylvania
(1976); Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983).
2031
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A. Interstate Banking Through Holding Company
A cquisition .......................................... 2058
1. Amending the Douglas Amendment ............. 2058
2. Compliance with Other Laws .................... 2061
3. Banks in Default or in Danger of Default ....... 2061
4. General State Authority over BHCs ............. 2061
B. Intracompany Agency Activities ..................... 2062
C. Interstate Bank Mergers ............................. 2063
1. Bank-Bank Mergers ............................. 2063
2. Bank-Branch Mergers ........................... 2065
3. Application and Approval Process ............... 2065
4. Banks in Default or in Danger of Default ....... 2067
5. Operations of Resulting Bank ................... 2067
6. Continuing State Authority ...................... 2068
7. Related provisions concerning branches ......... 2069
a. The National Bank Act ....................... 2069
b. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act ........... 2070
c. The National Bank Consolidation and Merger
A ct ........................................... 2071
d. The Home Owners' Loan Act ................ 2071
D. State "Opt-in" Provisions Permitting De Novo
Interstate Branching ................................. 2071
1. National Bank Branching ........................ 2072
2. Insured State Nonmember Bank Branching ..... 2072
E. Branching by Foreign Banks ......................... 2073
1. Effect of the 1991 Amendments to the IBA ..... 2073
2. Effect of IBBEA on Interstate Operations of
Foreign Banks ................................... 2077
F. Increased Oversight of Community Involvement by
Interstate Banking Enterprises ....... ... ; ....... 2079
1. Branch Closures ................................. 2079
2. Credit Needs of Communities Served by
Interstate Banking Enterprises .................. 2080
3. Community Reinvestment Act Concerns ........ 2081
a. Community Credit Needs and Foreign Bank
Operations ................................... 2082
b. CRA Evaluation of Banks with Interstate
Branches ..................................... 2082
IV. DOUBLING BACK: CONCLUSIONS ......................... 2082
INTRODUCTION
T HE U.S. bank regulatory system is in the midst of a decade of
significant change and challenge. This Article seeks to focus upon
some of the more striking developments that define the current state
of the system and the challenges that it now confronts. In this regard,
the Article focuses on four major legislative initiatives.
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Part I of this Article examines the effects of the enactment of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA"),1 which significantly restructured the system as it
prepared to enter a new decade.2 Part II identifies certain important
developments under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"),3 which were intended to rein-
force the efforts to improve the safety and soundness of the system
that was still reeling from the effects of the wave of depository institu-
tion failures that had begun in the previous decade.4
With this background in mind, Part III examines at length the re-
cent enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 ("IBBEA"),5 the first major deregulatory initi-
ative since 1980,6 which has poised the nation on the brink of genuine
interstate banking.7 This development raises as many policy questions
as it settles. In particular, will the emergence of an interstate banking
system threaten the availability of credit resources to local communi-
ties ostensibly served by banks drawn into an interstate system of
competition? IBBEA provides a number of safeguards intended to
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FIRREA]. For a discussion of the effects of FIR-
REA, see Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey from "Deregula-
tion" to "Supervisory Reregulation": The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1103 (1990); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Nor-
ton, The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Deal-
ing with the Regulators, 107 Banking LJ. 196 (1990); Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to
Fear but FIRREA Itself Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal
Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 1117 (1989) [hereinafter Malloy, Nothing to Fear];
Anthony C. Providenti Jr., Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned. Statu-
tory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989,59 Fordham L. Rev. S323 (1991); see also 1 Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and
Regulation § 1.4.3 (1994) [hereinafter Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation] (discuss-
ing the background of FIRREA).
2. See infra notes 12-134 and accompanying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FDICIA]. For a discussion of FDICIA, see 1 Mal-
loy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 1.4.5 and accompanying tables. See
also Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising the International
Banking Act of 1978, For the Worse? 60 Fordham L. Rev. S37 (1992) (discussing ef-
fects of FDICIA on U.S. regulation of U.S. operations of foreign banks).
4. See infra notes 135-263 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 399-429
and accompanying text (discussing FDICIA's amendments to the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2338 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IBBEA].
6. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the purpose and effects of the 1980 legislation, see gener-
ally Joseph A. DiNuzzo, The Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee.: Did It
Achieve the Goal? 101 Banking LJ. 100 (1984); Ronald L. Weaver & Andrew M.
O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980: An Overview, 98 Banking LI. 100 (1981).
7. See infra notes 264-473 and accompanying text.
19951 2033
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ensure continued access by local communities to adequate financial
services.8 In addition, the recently enacted Riegle Community Devel-
opment and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 ("CDRIA") 9 is in-
tended to provide federal financial incentives for a new breed of
community development financial institutions that will specialize in
economic revitalization and community development.10
Part IV of this Article offers some conclusions, intended to assess
the prospects facing federal bank regulatory policy in the remainder of
the decade and beyond." It concludes that challenges to the success
of the latest series of bank regulatory initiatives remain and that sig-
nificant regulatory objectives are as yet unaddressed or unfulfilled.
I. DOUBLED OVER: FIRREA AND THE CRIsIs IN BANK
REGULATORY POLICY
Throughout the previous decade, losses in the savings associations
industry mounted to record heights. 2 Largely in response to this
growing crisis, FIRREA was signed into law on August 9, 1989.13 This
part summarizes the principal features of FIRREA.
A. The Regulatory Environment
Among the principal statutory purposes of FIRREA was the re-
structuring of the regulatory environment of depository institutions.'
Some indication of the nature of the fundamental change underlying
the legislation is suggested by a simple shift in terminology. The Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA")' 5 now generally refers to "in-
8. See, e.g., infra notes 447-50 and accompanying text (discussing IBBEA provi-
sions with respect to community access).
9. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CDRIA].
10. See, e.g., infra notes 447-49 and accompanying text (discussing CDRIA
incentives).
11. See infra notes 474-84 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Nathaniel C. Nash, Savings Loss Put at $2.3 Billion, N.Y. Tunes, Mar.
22, 1989, at Dl (reporting 1988 fourth-quarter deficit in savings industry that brought
1988 total to record $12.1 billion deficit). Deposit withdrawals at thrifts were also
setting record highs. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Savings and Loan Withdrawals In Decem-
ber a Record $8.1 Billion, N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 11, 1989, at 1. The term "savings associa-
tion" is defined as a generic concept including federally chartered S&Ls and savings
banks, state-chartered building and loan associations, S&Ls, homestead associations,
cooperative banks (other than those that are "state banks" under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(a)(2)), and "any corporation (other than a bank) that the [FDIC] Board of
Directors and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision jointly determine to be
operating in substantially the same manner as a savings association." FIRREA
§ 204(b)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b).
13. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note.
14. See id.
15. Pub. L. No. 797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) [hereinafter FDIA].
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sured depository institutions"'16 rather than "insured banks."'17 Thus,
with FIRREA, federal bank regulation took a further step towards
structural realignment around a unifying, functional concept like "de-
pository institution" as its basic frame of reference.
This realignment had certain concrete consequences for the struc-
ture of federal regulation. The Board of Directors of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") was expanded to five
members, three of whom were directly appointed by the President,
with Senate advice and consent.'" The remaining two members serve
by virtue of their offices, i.e., the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Director of the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision.'9
The FDIC was given the responsibility of insuring deposits of sav-
ings associations.20 It now administers a Bank Insurance Fund
("BIF"), formerly the Permanent Insurance Fund with respect to de-
posits of insured banks,2 ' and a Savings Association Insurance Fund
("SAIF"), replacing the functions of the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC").2 - In addition, to wrap up the af-
fairs of the FSLIC, an FSLIC Resolution Fund was established. This
fund is to be managed and separately maintained by the FDIC and
consists of assets and liabilities transferred from the FSLIC.2- The
FSLIC Resolution Fund was to be dissolved upon the satisfaction of
all debts and liabilities and sale of all assets. 4
The FDIC's powers as conservator or receiver were also expanded
to include appointment as receiver for any insured depository institu-
16. For purposes of FDIA, the term "depository institution" is defined to mean
any "bank or savings association." FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1). On the new
generic term "savings association," see supra note 12. On the concept of the "deposi-
tory institution" as a technical term of art, see 1 Malloy, Banking Law and Regula-
tion, supra note 1, § 1.2.1.
17. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1815 note; see also id. § 1816 (listing factors to be con-
sidered in insurance applications and referring to "depository institution" rather than
"bank"); id. § 1819 (listing corporate powers of FDIC and referring to "depository
institution"); id. § 1822 (naming FDIC as receiver and referring to "depository
institution").
18. Id. § 1812(a)(1)(C).
19. Id. § 1812(a)(1)(A)-(B). On the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision,
see infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
20. FIREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a); see id. § 1437 note (giving procedure for differ-
ences in deposit insurance coverage between FDIC and abolished FSLIC). The pro-
cedures for termination of FDIC deposit insurance were also extensively revised. See
id. § 1818(a).
21. Id. § 1821(a)(4)-(5). On the investment of funds held in the BIF, see id.
§ 1823(a). For a discussion of the BIF, see David A. Segal, Note, A Note to Congress
and the FDIC: After FIRREA, Where's the BIF?, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S411 (1991).
22. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4), (6). On the investment of funds held in the
SAIF, see id. § 1823 (a). For a discussion of the SAIF, see Anne M. Taylor, Note, The
FDIC's Enhanced Powers over Savings Associations: Does FIRREA Make It
"SAIF"?, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S381 (1991).
23. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821a(a).
24. Id § 1821a(f).
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tion.2 Likewise, provisions concerning the use of FDIC funds with
respect to insured banks that are closed or are in danger of closing
were correspondingly amended. The provisions now cover the au-
thority of the FDIC to respond to the problem of insured depository
institutions in default.26
By far the most dramatic aspect of structural realignment under
FIRREA was the immediate abolition of the FSLIC27 and, effective
sixty days after enactment of FIRREA, the abolition of both the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") and the position of Chair-
man of the FHLBB.28 In addition, the Home Owners' Loan Act
("HOLA") 29 was completely revised by FIRREA. The Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS") was established within the Treasury De-
partment,"° and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
("DOTS") 31 effectively replaced the FHLBB and the Chairman of the
FHLBB, 32 except to the extent that any powers of the FHLBB or the
Chairman were transferred to other agencies.3 The DOTS was to be
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
for a term of five years.34 Despite the virtual collapse of the thrift
industry during the pendency of his tenure, FIRREA designated the
former Chairman of the FHLBB to serve as the DOTS, without re-
newed advice and consent of the Senate, through the remainder of the
period when he would have served as Chairman of the FHLBB. 5
25. See id. § 1821(c)-(l) (discussing appointment of FDIC as conservator or re-
ceiver), § 1822 (discussing FDIC as receiver).
26. See id. § 1823(c)-(f), (i), (k). 12 U.S.C. § 1823(i) was repealed by Pub. L. No.
97-320, § 206, 96 Stat. 1496 (1982).
27. FIRREA § 401(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 354; see id. § 401(b), 103 Stat. at 354 (dis-
cussing disposition and winding up of affairs of the FSLIC and FHLBB), § 401(c), 103
Stat. at 355 (discussing transitional authority and status of FHLBB Chairman),
§ 401(d), 103 Stat. at 355 (discussing status of employees), § 401(e), 103 Stat. at 355-56
(discussing continuation of services), § 401(0, 103 Stat. at 356 (discussing savings pro-
visions relating to FSLIC), § 401(h)-(i), 103 Stat. at 357 (discussing continuation of
orders, resolutions, determinations, and regulations of FSLIC and FHLBB), § 402(a)-
(b), 103 Stat. at 357-58 (discussing continuation and coordination of certain
regulations).
28. Id. § 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 354.
29. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468c (amending HOLA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 et
seq.).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a).
31. See id § 1462a(b) (establishing position of DOTS). See generally Franklin Say.
Assn v. Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, 740 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Kan. 1990)
(upholding appointment of conservator of failing savings association by interim direc-
tor); Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F.
Supp. 1183 (D.D.C.) (discussing succession and appointment of DOTS), appeal dis-
missed, 903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(e)(1).
33. Id. § 1462a(e)(2).
34. Id § 1462a(c)(1)-(2).
35. Id § 1462a(c)(5). This appointee resigned shortly thereafter. See Nathaniel C.
Nash, Top Savings Regulator Resigns and Strikes Back at His Critics, N.Y. Tunes, Dec.
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The DOTS is now included in the FDIA definition as the "appropri-
ate Federal banking agency" with respect to any savings association or
any savings and loan holding company ("SLHC").3 The DOTS has
the authority to charter federal savings associations 37 and is responsi-
ble for the examination, safe and sound operation and regulation of
such entities." As to chartering and permitting activities of federally
chartered savings associations under section 5 of HOLA, the DOTS
has statutory authority to enforce that section, as well as the authority
under the general enforcement provisions of section 8 of FDIA, 39and
regulations promulgated thereunder.' ° The DOTS is also authorized
to issue regulations as he or she determines to be appropriate to carry
out statutory responsibilities.41 Moreover, the DOTS is also charged
with the responsibility of prescribing by regulation uniform account-
ing and disclosure standards for savings associations.42
The DOTS was given exclusive jurisdiction to appoint conservators
and receivers for federally chartered savings associations.4 3 In addi-
tion, the DOTS was given the authority to promulgate regulations for
the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, and dissolution of sav-
ings associations, for mergers between insured savings associations,
and for savings associations in conservatorship or receivership."
Under statutorily specified grounds, the DOTS also has the power to
appoint conservators and receivers for insured state-chartered savings
associations.45
5, 1989, at Al. See generally Olympic Federal, 732 F. Supp. at 1197 (discussing ap-
pointment of director under FIRREA without Senate advice and consent).
36. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(4).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
38. Id. § 1463(a)(1). On examinations of savings associations, see id.
§ 1464(d)(1)(B). As to safety and soundness supervision, the amended HOLA speci-
fies that "[a]ll regulations and policies of the [DOTS] governing the safe and sound
operation of savings associations ... shall be no less stringent than those established
by the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks." Id. § 1463(c).
39. Id § 1818. For an analysis of these general enforcement powers, see generally
Malloy, Nothing to Fear, supra note 1.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(A).
41. Id. § 1463(a)(2).
42. Id § 1463(b)(1).
43. Id § 1464(d)(2)(B). On the grounds for appointment of a conservator or re-
ceiver for a federally chartered savings association, see id. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (stating
mandatory grounds), § 1464(d)(2)(B) (providing additional grounds, including con-
sent of the association, or removal from membership in a federal home loan bank or
from status as insured institution).
44. Id § 1464(d)(3)(A). In cases where the FDIC or the RTC is the conservator
or receiver, DOTS regulations are required to be consistent with regulations pre-
scribed by the FDIC. Id. § 1464(d)(3)(B). On the RTC, see infra notes 60-67 and
accompanying text.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A). Written approval of the state official with jurisdic-
tion over the insured association, indicating that one or more of the statutory grounds
exists, is generally necessary for the exercise of this authority by the DOTS. Id.
§ 1464(d)(2)(E)(i). But see id. § 1464(d)(2)(E)(ii) (discussing authority of DOTS to
proceed with appointment under certain circumstances).
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Establishment or acquisition of a subsidiary by a savings associa-
tion, or the initiation of a new activity through an existing subsidiary,
requires thirty day prior notification to both the FDIC and the
DOTS.' The conduct of any such subsidiaries was made subject to
regulations and orders of the DOTS. 7 Both the FDIC and the
DOTS, however, were given authority under the general enforcement
provisions of FDIA48 with respect to subsidiaries of savings associa-
tions.49 The DOTS, on the other hand, was also given divestiture
power with respect to such subsidiaries.50
In addition, FIRREA gave the FDIC the authority to determine, by
regulation or order, if any specific activity of a savings association
posed a serious threat to the SAIF and to order that no SAIF member
engage directly in any such activity.51 This authority did not limit the
authority of the DOTS to issue safety and soundness regulations gen-
erally or to enforce compliance with other applicable laws.52
With respect to permissible activities of savings associations, which
were newly subject to the general limitations under FDIA,53 equity
investments, whether by a state or federally chartered savings associa-
tion,54 were limited to those investments permissible for federal sav-
ings associations. 5 The FDIC was given the authority to require
divestiture of impermissible equity investments "as quickly as can be
prudently done, and in any event not later than July 1, 1994. "56 Simi-
larly, savings associations were generally prohibited from acquiring or
retaining, directly or through a subsidiary, any corporate debt security
not of investment grade.57
46. Id. § 1828(m)(1)(A). This provision does not apply to federal savings banks
chartered prior to October 15, 1982, to state-chartered savings banks, or to savings
associations that acquired their principal assets from institutions chartered prior to
October 15, 1982, as state-chartered savings banks ("grandfathered institutions"). Id.
§ 1828(m)(5).
47. Id § 1828(m)(1)(B). This provision does not apply to grandfathered institu-
tions under § 1828(m)(5)(A)-(B). See supra note 46.
48. See supra note 39.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(2)(A).
50. Id § 1828(m)(2)(B).
51. Id § 1828(m)(3)(A); see also id § 1828(m)(3)(C) (vesting additional authority
in the FDIC to prevent serious risks to SAIF and BIF).
52. Id § 1828(m)(3)(B).
53. See id § 1831e(a)-(b). These provisions did not require divestiture by a sav-
ings association of any assets acquired prior to the enactment of FIRREA. Id.
§ 1831e(g)(2).
54. See id § 1831e(c)(1).
55. Id An exception from this limitation was provided for service corporations.
Id § 1831e(c)(2).
56. Id § 1831e(c)(3)(A). For the treatment of noncompliance during the divest-
ment process, see id § 1831e(c)(3)(B).
57. Id § 1831e(d)(1). For these purposes, the term "corporate debt security not of
investment grade" did not include obligations issued or guaranteed by a corporation
that could be held by a federal savings association under the newly amended HOLA.
Id. § 1831e(d)(4)(C); see id. § 1464(c)(1)(D)-(F). The term "investment grade" was
2038 [Vol. 63
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FIRREA also transformed the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
With the abolition of the FHLBB, a new Federal Housing Finance
Board ("F-FB") was established. 8 Among other things, the FHFB
was intended to supervise the federal home loan banks ("FHLBs") in
carrying out their housing finance mission.5 9
To "resolve" all cases involving FSLIC-insured institutions placed in
conservatorship or receivership between January 1, 1989 and the date
of enactment of FIRREA, or to be so placed within the three year
period following its enactment, three new regulatory entities were cre-
ated. The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was established,10
among other things, for the express purpose of managing and resolv-
ing such cases.61 The RTC, originally under the exclusive manage-
ment of the FDIC,62 is now managed by its own chief executive
officer.6 3 FIRREA also established an Oversight Board64 to oversee
and be accountable for the RTC.65 Finally, FIRREA established the
Resolution Funding Corporation ("REFCO")66 as the mechanism for
providing funds to the RTC.67
B. Organization of New Depository Institutions
Another important feature of FIRREA was the organization of new
depository institutions. FIRREA gave the FDIC the authority to or-
ganize any "new bank," i.e., a new national bank in the same commu-
nity as a bank in default, which would assume the insured deposits of
the latter and would perform temporarily functions specified in FIR-
REA.68 New banks require authorization of the Comptroller to trans-
defined for these purposes to mean a security that, "when acquired by the savings
association or subsidiary, was rated in one of the 4 highest rating categories by at least
one nationally recognized statistical rating organization." Id. § 1831e(d)(4)(A). For
an exception from this prohibition for debt securities held by a "qualified affiliate" of
a savings association, see id. § 1831e(d)(2). On the definition of "qualified affiliate"
for these purposes, see id. § 1831e(d)(4)(B). Under certain circumstances, with the
approval of the DOTS, ineligible corporate debt securities could be transferred in
exchange for "qualified notes." See id. § 1831e(e).
58. Id. § 1422a(a)(1).
59. Id. §§ 1422a(a)(3)(B), 1422b(a)(1) (describing general powers and duties of
FHFB); see also id. § 1431 (enumerating powers and duties of FHLBs).
60. Id. § 1441a(b)(1).
61. Id. § 1441a(b)(3)(A).
62. Id § 1441a(b)(1)(C).
63. Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement
Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(8)(C).
64. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(1).
65. I1& § 1441a(a)(2).
66. Id. § 1441b(b).
67. See id. § 1441b(d). On the exempt status of REFCO debt obligations under
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77d, see Securities Act Release No. 33-
6844, Sept. 8, 1989, reprinted in 1989 SEC Lexis 1757. On the exemption of such
securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, see 17 C.F.LR§ 240.3a12-10 (1994).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)(1).
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act any other business. 69 In addition, when one or more insured banks
are in default, or when the FDIC anticipates that they may come into
default, the FDIC has the authority to organize, and the Comptroller
to charter, "bridge banks" to assume deposits of such insured banks. 70
Under FIRREA, federal chartering of savings associations 71 is
within the authority of the DOTS, under such regulations as the
DOTS may provide, "giving primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of thrift institutions in the United States."'72 A federal savings
association may act as a trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or
in any other fiduciary capacity in which a state bank, trust company,
or other corporation that competes with federal savings associations is
permitted to act. It must do so, however, under the laws of the state
in which the federal savings association is located, and upon the issu-
ance of a special permit by the DOTS.73
C. Management of Depository Institutions
Changes have also been made with respect to the management of
depository institutions. Consistent with recommendations made by
the Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS"),7 4
FIRREA generally mandated the publication and availability to the
public of final orders issued with respect to administrative enforce-
ment proceedings initiated by these agencies against depository insti-
tutions and their institutions' insiders.75 FIRREA also required that
the federal regulators jointly establish their own pool of administra-
tive law judges for formal adjudications 76 and develop a set of uniform
rules and procedures for administrative hearings, including provisions
for "summary judgment" rulings against management where there are
no disputes as to material facts of the case.77 On the other hand, FIR-
REA created significant authority for the federal regulators to disap-
prove in certain specified circumstances the proposed addition of any
69. Id § 1821(m)(9).
70. Ia § 1821(n)(1). To the extent that a bridge bank assumes any insured depos-
its of a failing bank, all insured deposits of the failing bank must be assumed by the
bridge bank or another insured depository institution. Id. § 1821(n)(1)(B)(i).
71. On the definition of "savings association" for these purposes, see id. § 1462(4)
(referring to 12 U.S.C. § 1813).
72. Id § 1464(a)(2).
73. Id § 1464(n)(1).
74. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1994).
75. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(u)(1), 1786(s)(1).
76. Id. § 1818 note; see Michael P. Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Con-
fidentiality: Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory
Agencies, 61 Temple L. Rev. 723, 795-97 (1988) [hereinafter Malloy, Balancing the
Public Confidence] (discussing the ACUS recommendation leading to the FIRREA
requirement).
77. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 note; see Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence,
supra note 76, at 793-94.
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individual to the board of directors or the employment of any individ-
ual as a senior executive officer of a depository institution.7"
FIRREA also undertook a significant expansion and enhancement
of regulatory enforcement and criminal liability provisions with re-
spect to depository institutions.7 9 Among other things, it gave express
authority to the FDIC to take enforcement action against savings as-
sociations in the absence of action by the DOTS and in accordance
with FDIC recommendations. s0
In addition, the categories of individuals subject to the general en-
forcement authority of the federal regulators was expanded. The ge-
neric concept of "institution-affiliated party" was substituted for such
specific concepts as director, officer, employee, agent, or "other per-
son participat[ing] in the conduct of the affairs" of an institution.8 '
The enforcement provisions of FDIA were also expanded to cover not
only "banks" but all "depository institutions."'
Furthermore, FIRREA's expansion of the cease-and-desist and
temporary cease-and-desist authority of the regulatory enforcement
provisionss3 contained an apparent repudiation of Larimore v. Cono-
ver. 4 FIRREA now expressly authorizes-contrary to the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Larimore-orders requiring restitution or reim-
bursement, indemnification or guarantee against loss in certain speci-
fied circumstances.as In addition, removal and prohibition authority is
now merged in the regulatory enforcement provisions.8 Express au-
thority is granted for industry-wide imposition of removal, suspension,
and prohibition orders.87 Under certain specified circumstances, ex-
press authority is also granted to institute regulatory enforcement pro-
ceedings against institution-affiliated parties who have resigned, been
terminated, or otherwise have separated from the institution,8 con-
78. See FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 note.
79. See generally Bruce A. Green, After the Falk The Criminal Law Enforcement
Response to the S&L Crisis, 59 Fordham L Rev. S155 (1991) (discussing FIR1EA's
criminal penalties).
80. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t).
81. See, e.g., id §§ 1786(r), 1813(u) (defining "institution-affiliated party" for pur-
poses of the Federal Credit Union Act ("FCUA") and FDIA, respectively); see also
id- §§ 1786(e)(1), (f), (i)(1), (3), 0)(2), (o), 1818(b)(1), (c), (e)(4)-(f), (g)(1), (3),
(h)(2), (/), (m) (all utilizing new terminology in NCUA and DIA).
82. See id. § 1818(a)(1).
83. See id. §§ 1786(f)(1), 1818(b).
84. 789 F.2d 1244, 1256 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting Comptroller's order requiring
reimbursement by bank insider of loss to the bank).
85. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (requiring restitution in cases of un-
just enrichment or reckless disregard for the law).
86. See, eg., id. § 1818(e)(1) (defining authority to issue removal and prohibition
orders).
87. See, e.g., id. § 1818(e)(7) (defining authority to impose industry-wide prohibi-
tion upon removed or suspended officials).
88. See id. § 1818(i)(3). To similar effect is FIRREA's amendment of the National
Bank Act enforcement provision. See id. § 93(b).
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trary to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Stoddard v. Board of
Governors.89
FIRREA also expanded the removal powers under the general reg-
ulatory enforcement provisions to include state criminal proceedings
as a ground for removal.90 Federal criminal penalties for knowing
participation in any institution's affairs in violation of a removal or
prohibition order were clarified,91 and criminal penalties for knowing
unauthorized participation by a convicted person have been in-
creased. 92 In addition, civil money penalties were expanded and
increased.93
D. Exercise of Control
FIRREA amended the Change in Bank Control Act ("CBCA") 94
to indicate expressly that, under certain specified circumstances, the
resignation, termination of employment or participation, divestiture of
control, or separation of or by an institution-affiliated party did not
affect the jurisdiction and authority of the appropriate federal banking
agency to proceed against such a party under the CBCA.9 5 Civil
money penalties for violations of the CBCA were expanded and
increased.96
E. Capital Adequacy Supervision
Another important feature of FIRREA is the increased supervision
of capital adequacy. The amended HOLA directed the DOTS, consis-
tent with the purposes of section 908 of the International Lending Su-
pervision Act of 198397 and the capital requirements established
thereunder by the federal banking regulators, to require all savings
associations to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing
minimum capital levels and by using other methods as determined to
be appropriate by the DOTS.98 Consistent with provisions concerning
capital standards, 99 the DOTS may establish minimum capital levels
on a case-by-case basis, by amount or at a capital-to-assets ratio.100
Failure by a savings association to maintain capital at or above the
89. 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
90. See, e.g., FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1) (striking requirement of authoriza-
tion by a U.S. attorney).
91. See id. §§ 1786(), 1818(j).
92. See, e.g., id § 1829 (establishing minimum 10-year prohibition period and
monetary penalties).
93. See, e.g., id § 1818(i)(2) (establishing three tiers of civil money penalties).
94. Id § 1817G).
95. Id. § 18170)(15).
96. Id. § 18170)(16).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 3907.
98. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(1)(A)-(B).
99. See idt § 1464(t); see also infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing
capital standards).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(2).
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minimum level may be treated by the DOTS as an unsafe or unsound
practice.1 1 The DOTS was also authorized to issue capital direc-
tives"°2 and to enforce directives and capital plans approved thereun-
der in the same manner as outstanding, final orders issued under the
general enforcement provisions of FDIA.103 Progress in complying
with any capital plan could be taken into account by the DOTS in
considering any other proposal by a savings association or affiliate
that would have the effect of diverting earnings, diminishing capital,
or otherwise impeding progress with respect to the capital plan." 4
Such a proposal could be disapproved if the DOTS determined that it
would adversely affect the ability of the association to comply with a
capital plan.0
The amended HOLA also required the DOTS to prescribe by regu-
lation and maintain uniformly applicable capital standards for savings
associations." The prescribed capital standards were required to in-
clude (1) a leverage limit of core capital'17 in an amount not less than
three percent of a savings association's total assets;108 (2) a tangible
capital'09 requirement in an amount not less than 1.5% of a savings
association's total assets; 1 0 and (3) a risk-based capital require-
ment."' The prescribed standards were to be no less stringent than
those applicable to national banks." 2
F. Holding Company Supervision
FIRREA drew the provisions governing the regulation of S&L
holding companies into HOLA itself." 3 For these purposes, a "say-
101. IE § 1464(s)(3).
102. I& § 1464(s)(4)(A).
103. Id- § 1464(s)(4)(B); see also id. § 1818 (providing FDIA enforcement
provision).
104. It § 1464(s)(5)(A).
105. Id § 1464(s)(5)(B).
106. Id § 1464(t)(1)(A).
107. Id- § 1464(t)(1)(A)(i). On the definition of "core capital" for these purposes,
see id § 1464(t)(9)(A).
108. IM § 1464(t)(2)(A).
109. id. § 1464(t)(1)(A)(ii). The term "tangible capital" was defined for these pur-
poses to mean core capital less any intangible assets. Id § 1464(t)(9)(C). But see id.
§ 1464(t)(3) (stating transition rule permitting inclusion of "qualifying supervisory
goodwill" in calculation of core capital of certain eligible savings associations through
December 31, 1994); § 1464(t)(3)(B) (giving meaning of "eligible savings associa-
tion"), 1464(t)(9)(B) (providing definition of "qualifying supervisory goodwill").
110. Id. § 1464(t)(2)(B).
111. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(A)(iii), (2)(C). A savings association would not be in compli-
ance with the statutory capital standards unless it complied with all three prescribed
standards. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(B). On the legal consequences of a failure to comply with
the capital standards, see id. § 1464(t)(6)-(7).
112. Id. § 1464(t)(1)(C).
113. See generally id § 1461-1470 (enacting new HOLA § 10, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a,
concerning the regulation of S&L holding companies).
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ings and loan holding company" was defined to mean any company' 14
that directly or indirectly controls a savings association1 5 or that con-
trols any other company which is a savings and loan holding
company. 116
FIRREA also amended section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act ("BHCA")" 7 expressly to facilitate thrift acquisitions by bank
holding companies, 118 such that they were no longer limited to acqui-
sitions of failing thrifts. In addition, FIRREA indicated that the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") was
not to impose any special restrictions beyond those generally applica-
ble on transactions between acquired institutions and their holding
company affiliates. 1 9 The Fed was also required to remove any such
restrictions on pre-FIRREA thrift acquisitions. 20
G. Mergers and Acquisitions
FIRREA also amended the Bank Merger Act ("BMA")' 2 ' in light
of the significant changes in the federal regulatory structure. The
newly created DOTS was identified as the "responsible agency" for
approval with respect to covered mergers and acquisitions "if the ac-
quiring, assuming, or resulting institution is to be a savings associa-
tion."'122 This was the first time savings associations were covered by
the BMA.
H. Conversions
Under FIRREA, conversion of a state-chartered savings association
that is eligible to become a member of an FHL Bank into a federal
savings association, and any accompanying conversion from mutual to
stock or stock to mutual form, 23 are subject to regulations prescribed
by the DOTS."z Further, any federal savings association could
change its designation from a federal savings association to a federal
savings bank, or vice versa.'2 A federal savings association could
114. On the definition of "company" for these purposes, see id. § 1467a(a)(1)(C).
115. On the meaning of the term "savings association" for these purposes, see id.
§ 1467a(a)(1)(A).
116. Id- § 1467a(a)(1)(D).
117. Id § 1843.
118. Id. § 1843(i)(1).
119. Id. § 1843(i)(2).
120. i& § 1843(i)(2).
121. Id. § 1828(c).
122. Id. § 1828(c)(2)(D).
123. Conversion of any savings association from mutual to stock or stock to mutual
form was prohibited except in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
DOTS. Id. § 1464(i)(2)(A).
124. Id. § 1464(i)(1); see Michael P. Malloy, Seeing the Light: Savings Associations
Conversions and Federal Regulatory Realignment, 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 189, 198-
211 (1991) (analyzing the OTS regulations governing mutual-to-stock conversions).
125. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(2)(C).
2044 [Vol. 63
BANK REGULATORY POLICY
convert into a state savings association or savings bank, organized
under the laws of the state in which the principal office of the associa-
tion is located, on certain specified conditions. 26
Conversion of a state savings bank that is a member of the BIF into
a federal savings bank is permitted, subject to the provisions of the
amended HOLA 127 and pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
DOTS.- - The DOTS was authorized to provide for the organization,
incorporation, operation, examination, and regulation of such con-
verted savings banks. 29 A converted savings bank continued to be a
BIF member until such time as it changed its status to a SAIF
member.1 30
Consistent with the purposes of HOLA, the DOTS was also author-
ized, notwithstanding any other provision of law: (1) to approve or (in
the case of a federal savings association) to require conversion of a
mutual savings association or an FDIC-insured federal mutual savings
bank into a federal stock savings association or federal stock savings
bank; (2) to charter a federal stock savings association or federal stock
savings bank to acquire the assets of such a mutual institution; or, (3)
to charter a federal stock savings association or federal stock savings
bank to merge with such a mutual institution.' 3 Such conversions
126. Id § 1464(i)(3)(A)(i)-(vi). This provision conditioned these conversions on
the following:
(i) The State permits conversion of any savings associations or savings banks
of such State into a Federal savings associations;
(ii) such conversion must be approved by the requisite vote, in person or by
proxy, of members or stockholders of the association in accordance with
state law, but in no event by less than 51 percent of the votes cast at the
members' or stockholders' meeting, and in compliance with any other re-
quirements reciprocally equivalent to the requirements of state law for con-
version of a state chartered institution into a federal savings association.
(iii) The requisite notice of the meeting must be given.
Id. For the notice requirements, see id § 1464(i)(3)(A)(iii). The conditions further
included.
(iv) If the converted institution is mutual in form, upon dissolution after
conversion the members or shareholders must share in the assets of the asso-
ciation in exact proportion to there relative share or account credits.
(v) If the converted institution is stock in form, upon dissolution after con-
version the stock holders must share on an equitable basis in the assets of
the association.
(vi) The conversion must be effective on the date that all provisions of the
HOLA have been fully complied with, and upon the issuance of the new
charter by the state in which the association is located.
Id 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i)(A)(iv)-(vi).
127. See id- § 1464(o)(2)(B)-(E).
128. Id § 1464(o)(1).
129. Id
130. Id § 1464(o)(2)(A).
131. Id § 1464(p)(1). For a case upholding the DOTS authority under § 146 4 (p),
see Smallwood v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 925 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1991); see also
Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking 215-17 (1992) [hereinafter Regulation
of Banking] (discussing forced conversions under § 1464(p)).
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were authorized only if a condition specified under FIRREA was
met.
1 32
A federal savings bank chartered under these provisions would
have the same authority and be subject to the same restrictions as
would apply if it had been chartered as a federal savings bank under
any other provision of HOLA.133 In addition, it could engage in any
investment, activity, or operation that the acquired institution was en-
gaged in, if the latter was a federal savings bank, or would have been
authorized to engage in if it had converted to a federal charter.131
II. DOUBLE OR NOTHING: FDICIA AND BANK SUPERVISION
This part discusses the events leading up to the passage of FDICIA
and identifies its important features. The FDICIA was intended to
reinforce efforts to improve the safety and soundness of the financial
services system after the wave of depository institution failures in the
1980s.
A. The Treasury Modernization Study and the State of Play in
Bank Regulatory Policy
Although FIRREA has had both immediate and long-term conse-
quences for the regulation of depository institutions in the United
States, ultimately it neither resolved the crisis over failures nor re-
turned the depository institutions to a safe and competitive condition.
This situation was underscored by a 1991 Treasury report ("'fTeasury
Modernization Study") 135 based upon an eighteen-month interagency
consultation and study mandated by FIRREA itself. 36 The legislative
recommendations contained in the Treasury Modernization Study re-
ceived congressional consideration,' 37 but eventually a much narrower
bill was enacted as FDICIA. Nevertheless, the proposals contained in
132. See FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(p)(2)(A)-(C), which identifies the following
alternative conditions:
(i) The DOTS determined that severe financial conditions existed that
threatened the stability of the association to be converted, and that the con-
version was likely to improve the financial condition of the association.
(ii) The FDIC had contracted to provide assistance to the association under
12 U.S.C. § 1823.
(iii) The conversion was intended to assist an institution in receivership.
Id.
133. Id § 1464(p)(3).
134. lId
135. U.S. Treas. Dep't, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for
Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1377, pt. II (Feb. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Treasury Modernization Study]. For a critique
of the study from a state regulatory perspective, see generally Jill M. Considine, A
State's Response to the United States Treasury Department Proposals to Modernize the
Nation's Banking System, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S243 (1991).
136. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1811.
137. See S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Rec. S3739 (daily ed. March 20,
1991).
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the study may contribute to the shape of future reform efforts, and so
some analysis of those proposals is warranted here.
1. The Crisis in the Bank Regulatory System
A review of the concerns raised by the Treasury suggests the seri-
ousness of the situation confronting any such efforts.1 38 Against this
background, the study made a number of dramatic recommendations
for legislative reform of the financial services system.
Among these were proposals for the reorganization of the federal
regulatory structure with respect to depository institutions. In keep-
ing with the recommendations of the 1984 Task Group Report, 139 the
Treasury Modernization Study recommended the replacement of the
"four federal regulator banking model"' 40 with a two-regulator ap-
proach, in which the same regulator would be responsible for a hold-
ing company and its bank subsidiary.14 1 Under this approach, the Fed
would be responsible for all state-chartered banks and their holding
companies. 42 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC") (and eventually the OTS as well) would be replaced by a
new Federal Banking Agency ("FBA"), which would be responsible
for all national banks and all federal and state-chartered savings as-
sociations, 43 as well as the holding companies of each." The FDIC
would be refocused on its insurance and resolution functions, 4S and
its present supervisory functions with respect to state-chartered non-
member banks would be transferred to the Fed.'4
138. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 9-10 (discussing serious
problems in the structure and condition of the U.S. banking system). Among other
things, the study recommended the recapitalization of the BIF. See id. at 65-69. A
capital infusion was effected by the legislation eventually enacted. See FDICIA, 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (providing assessment rate changes and rules for recapi-
talization of BIF); see also id. § 1824(d) (allowing borrowing for B]F from BIF
members).
139. See I Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 1.4.2 (discussing
1984 Task Group Report); see also Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at
XIX-1 to XIX-14 (discussing reform of regulatory structure and reflecting public and
agency comments from participating in the consultation of the study).
140. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 63. The four regulators re-
ferred to are: the Comptroller, the Fed, the FDIC and the OTS. See id.
141. ld.
142. 1& The current regulatory functions of the FDIC would thus be transferred to
the Fed. Id.
143. Id
144. Id. If a holding company controlled both state-chartered banks (regulated by
the Fed) and national banks (regulated by the FBA), responsibility for the holding
company would be placed with the regulator of the larger bank. Id. The study antici-
pated that the Fed and the FBA would "mutually agree on [holding company] regula-
tory policies and practices." Id.
145. Id. at 65.
146. Iae at 63.
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The study also recommended that the NCUA be reorganized to in-
clude a representative from the proposed FBA.147
2. The Deposit Insurance System
The Treasury Modernization Study took the position that deposit
insurance coverage was overextended and was the potential source of
serious future problems in the regulatory system. In that light, the
study advanced a number of recommendations aimed at reforming the
deposit insurance system.
First, the study recommended the assessment of deposit insurance
premiums on the basis of risk.148 This risk was to be measured on the
basis of a bank's risk-based capital level.149
Second, the study recommended the reduction of coverage for mul-
tiple insured accounts. 50 In this regard, individual coverage would
have been limited to $100,000 per institution, eliminating coverage of,
for example, a second $100,000 held jointly with another individual in
the same institution. 15 Retirement savings (such as Keogh accounts,
IRAs, and pension fund accounts) would have had a separate
$100,000 coverage beyond the individual limitation per institution.152
In addition, the study set as a long-term goal the limitation of deposit
insurance to $100,000 per individual system-wide. 5 3 The FDIC, how-
ever, had voiced opposition to this recommendation, 54 and so the
study recommended that the FDIC carry out an eighteen-month cost-
benefit analysis with respect to the recommendation. 155
Third, the study recommended the elimination of coverage of cer-
tain "pass-through" accounts. 56 The recommendation specifically in-
cluded defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans (except
for self-directed plans), 57 and bank investment contracts ("BICs"). 58
147. Ia at 60.
148. Id at 33.
149. Ide; see also id. at 43-45 (discussing risk-based deposit insurance recommenda-
tions), VIII-1 to VIII-20 (discussing risk-related premiums and reflecting public com-
ments and agency comments from participating in the consultation for the study).
150. Ide at 35-38.
151. led at 37. This change would have taken place over a two-year transitional
period. Id.
152. Id
153. le
154. See id
155. ld at 37-38.
156. Ie at 38-39; see id. V-1 to V-18 (discussing "pass-through" insurance and re-
flecting public comments and agency comments from participating in the consultation
for the study). For these purposes, the study defines "pass-through" insurance as in-
volving a situation in which a fiduciary deposits funds for a large number of benefi-
ciaries, with $100,000 of deposit insurance "passing through" to each of the
beneficiaries. Id at 38.
157. let at 38-39.
158. Iae at 39. A BIC is a bank-sponsored product in which a retirement fund in-
vestor is permitted to deposit funds with the bank over time, with a guaranteed inter-
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Fourth, the study recommended the elimination of deposit insur-
ance coverage for brokered deposits.1 5 9 This recommendation would
have been phased in over a two-year transitional period."6 The elimi-
nation would not have applied to brokered deposits at institutions in
conservatorship with the RTC or the FDIC 6' so that these agencies
could continue temporarily to "use government-guaranteed credit for
liquidity purposes if the practice would lower resolution costs for the
taxpayer. "162
Fifth, the study called for a continuation of the current FDIC policy
of not protecting general, subordinated, and holding company credi-
tors in situations in which a subject bank is failing.163 Thus, non-de-
posit creditors would have been left to their normal pro rata
bankruptcy losses, even if the FDIC decided to make whole the unin-
sured depositors of the bank."6
At the same time, however, the study urged that protection of unin-
sured depositors of failing banks be more limited in practice. 65 In this
regard, FDIC resolution of a failing bank situation should involve the
least expensive method, 66 except where the Treasury Department
and the Fed determined that "systemic risk" required the use of a rel-
atively more expensive method.167 In any event, the study urged im-
proved liquidity mechanisms for situations of pro rata payouts to
uninsured depositors and other nondeposit creditors.' 6s These recom-
mendations with respect to uninsured depositors were intended to be
phased in over a three year period. 69
Furthermore, while recognizing that foreign deposits of U.S. banks
have generally been included by the FDIC in the resolution of failing
U.S. banks, the study affirmed that these deposits should not be sub-
est rate for the term of the contract. See id The interest rate risk to the bank "can be
effectively managed through contract limitations and hedging strategies." Id. The
existence of BICs places insurance companies offering similar "Government Invest-
ment Contracts" without the deposit insurance feature at a competitive disadvantage.
Id.
159. Id. at 39; see id. IV-1 to IV-10 (discussing brokered insured deposits and re-
flecting public comments and agency comments from participating in the consultation
for the study).
160. Id. at 39.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 40.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 40-41.
167. Id. at 40. On this "systemic risk" exception, see id. at 41. On suggested meth-
ods to reduce systemic risk, see id. at 42.
168. See id at 41-42. See generally id. III-1 to 11-43 (discussing scope of deposit
insurance and reflecting public comments and comments by agencies participating in
the consultation and study).
169. Id. at 42.
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ject to deposit insurance assessment. 170 The trade-off in this regard
was that the study anticipated that foreign deposits of U.S. banks
would be included in the reduction of protection accorded all unin-
sured deposits, whether domestic or foreign. 71
3. Increased Supervision of Management of Depository Institutions
The Treasury Modernization Study recommended increased super-
vision of management of depository institutions through improve-
ments in the techniques and tools of supervision, primarily through an
increased focus on capital. 17 In the context of supervision generally,
the study stressed prompt corrective action as a central theme. 173 Any
action should be attuned to the relative capital strength of a subject
bank (ranging from "Zone 1" for the most capitalized to "Zone 5" for
failing institutions).' 74 These changes in the supervisory system were
expected to take place over a three-year transitional period . 75 As a
crucial aid to improved supervision, the study also stressed the need
for annual on-site examination 76 and improved reporting from in-
dependent auditors. 77
4. Increased Supervision of Capital as a Source of Strength
In addition, the Treasury Modernization Study took the position
that capital was "[t]he single most powerful tool to make banks
safer.' 78 In this regard, it took a very traditional view of the role of
capital in corporate governance and regulatory oversight of deposi-
tory institutions:
[Capital] is an "up-front" cushion to absorb losses ahead of the tax-
payer, and banks are less likely to take excessive risk when they
have substantial amounts of their own money at stake. Yet the [de-
posit insurance] safety net has permitted banks to have lower capi-
tal ratios than other financial companies. The bank regulatory
170. Il at 42-43; see id VI-1 to VI-10 (discussing insurance treatment of foreign
deposits and reflecting public comments and agency comments from participating in
the consultation for study).
171. I& at 42.
172. See id. at 46; cf id. IX-1 to IX-21 (discussing risk management techniques and
reflecting public comments as well as agency comments derived from consulting on
the study), id. X-1 to X-22 (discussing the need for prompt corrective action and re-
flecting public comments as well as agency comments derived from consulting on the
study).
173. See id. at 46.
174. IM at 46-48.
175. IM at 48.
176. Id
177. Id at 49-50.
178. Id at 29.
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system is not adequately focused on the crucial importance of
capital.179
Significantly, the study did not recommend that capital standards be
raised, but rather, that the role of capital be strengthened.18° It may
seem anomalous to speak of "strengthening" the role of capital with-
out raising capital standards, but the Treasury Modernization Study
detailed a series of recommendations that gave substance to this
position.""1
First, it recommended that the bank regulatory system give greater
emphasis to the relative capital level of a bank as an indicator of the
degree of supervision that should be exercised by its regulator.1 It
should be noted, however, that the notion of using capital levels in this
manner is already a recognized element of bank supervision.'8 Nev-
ertheless, increased emphasis on relative capital levels for supervisory
purposes doubtless would be an advance over current practices.
Second, the study recommended the assessment of deposit insur-
ance premiums on the basis of risk.18 In this regard, risk would be
measured on the basis of a bank's risk-based capital level.185
Third, the study recommended that "financial services holding com-
panies" ("FSHCs")186 with well-capitalized bank subsidiaries be per-
mitted to engage in a range of financial activities through nonbanking
affiliates. 87 Apparently, the expectation was that the promise of a
broader range of activities would encourage banks to build and main-
tain capital and would also enhance market prospects for new issues
made by previously undercapitalized banks.1s
Fourth, the study noted that the current risk-based capital standards
did not focus significantly on interest rate risk in evaluating the rela-
tive risk of bank assets.'8 9 It urged the development of methods to
monitor interest rate risk and adjust risk-based capital ratios accord-
ingly, to avoid "banks ... shift[ing] into assets that are more sensitive
to interest rate risk."'"
179. Il For a detailed treatment of capital and capital adequacy, see id. f1-1 to H-
28.
180. Id at 29.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 33; see also id at 45-49 (discussing capital-based supervision as an ele-
ment of improved supervision).
183. See, ag., 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 5.3.3.4 (not-
ing that Fed regulations require a higher degree of oversight for banks with relatively
low capital ratios).
184. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 33.
185. See 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 5.3.3.4 (discussing
risk-based capital measurement).
186. On the proposed FSHC, see infra note 207 and accompanying text.
187. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 33.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Id
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Fifth, the study called for an increased focus on capital-based super-
vision. 191 In particular, it looked to improved capital measurement' 92
as the primary means of improving supervision of banks.
5. Securities Activities of Depository Institutions
The Treasury Modernization Study recommended that well capital-
ized banks be permitted to have financial affiliates engaging in, inter
alia, full-service securities activities and mutual fund activities.'9 3 This
grant of authority would be subject to a number of significant
safeguards. 94
The study also called for the prohibition of certain direct investment
activities of state-chartered banks.195 As to other activities not per-
mitted for national banks, the study recommended that state-
chartered banks be required to comply with two conditions before en-
gaging in such activities: satisfaction of capital adequacy require-
191. See id. at 45-49.
192. 1&. at 48-49.
193. IAL at 56; see also itt XVIII-1 to XVIII-32 (discussing financial services mod-
ernization and reflecting public comments as well as agency comments derived from
consulting on the study).
194. These safeguards would include: (1) the authority would only be available to
well-capitalized banks and their "financial services holding companies" (FSHCs); (2)
only the bank affiliate of the FSHC would have access to the federal "safety net,"
consisting of deposit insurance, the Fed's discount window, and the federal payments
system; (3) strict regulation would be focused on the bank affiliate, and the principal
regulatory objective would be protection of the bank, not its holding company; (4) the
newly authorized activities would be required to be carried out in separately capital-
ized nonbanking affiliates; (5) the activities would be subject to the principle of "func-
tional regulation" requiring, for example, that securities activities be regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission rather than by the bank regulators; (6) funding
and disclosure firewalls would be required, separating the bank affiliate from its hold-
ing company and nonbanking affiliates; and (7) "umbrella oversight" of the FSHC
would be required, to ensure the safety of the bank affiliate. Id. at 57-59.
The oversight by the bank regulator would include the authority to examine the
FSHC, the bank, and any nonbanking affiliate posing a risk to the bank affiliate. Re-
ciprocal examination rights would exist for the regulator, if any, of the nonbanking
affiliate. Id at 59. The regulator could also require the sale of any nonbanking affili-
ate posing a "clear threat" to the bank affiliate. Id. In addition, the regulator could
require the FSHC to act as a "source of strength" for any bank affiliate that falls
below minimum capital standards. Id. The study, however, emphasized that the
FSHC would generally not be subject to any "cumbersome, bank-like regulation." Id.
195. Id. at 50-51. Specifically, the study recommended the prohibition of direct
equity investment of insured deposit funds in commercial real estate and other com-
mercial enterprises, both for reasons of competitive parity and risk avoidance. As the
study noted:
National banks are not permitted to make [such investments,... although
some states permit state-chartered banks to conduct such activities. While
state[ ] banks have been more limited and prudent about this authority than
state thrifts, direct equity investment remains a greater risk to the federal
deposit insurance fund than traditional bank loans that have a more senior
claim on assets.
Id. at 51.
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ments196 and determination by the FDIC that the activity would not
create a significant risk of loss to the insurance fund."9 These new
federal restrictions would not have applied to "riskless" agency activi-
ties authorized for state-chartered banks by their state regulators. 19s
6. Holding Company Activities
The Treasury Modernization Study advanced a number of recom-
mendations that would have affected in significant ways the regulation
and formation of holding companies. Primary regulatory responsibil-
ity for holding companies would have been divided between the Fed,
charged with responsibility for the holding companies of all state-
chartered banks,199 and the new FBA, 0 charged with responsibility
for the holding companies of all national banks and all federal and
state-chartered thrift institutions.0 1 In the case of any holding com-
pany controlling both a state-chartered bank, to be regulated by the
Fed,202 and a national bank, to be regulated by the FBA,203 responsi-
bility for the holding company regulation would be assumed by the
regulator of whichever bank was larger.204 The Fed and the FBA
would be required to reach mutual agreement on holding company
regulatory policies and practices.20 -5
As was previously mentioned,2°0 the study also raised the possibility
of a new variety of holding company, the FSHC. This truly diversified
financial services enterprise would be authorized to engage in a range
of financial activities through nonbanking affiliates of the FSHC.207
B. FDICIA's Narrow Response
In December 1991, President Bush signed into law two pieces of
legislation intended to reform certain aspects of federal bank regula-
tion: the Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring,
and Improvement Act of 1991 ("RTCIA")2m and FDICIA. This sec-
196. Id; cf. 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 5.4.2 (discussing
the increased emphasis on capital supervision in bank regulation).
197. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 51.
198. Id
199. Id at 63.
200. On the FBA, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
201. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 63.
202. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
204. Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 63.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for
FSHCs under the Study); see also supra note 187 (discussing use of FSHCs as a safe-
guard in nonbanking activities).
207. See Treasury Modernization Study, supra note 135, at 53-59.
208. Pub. L. No. 102-233, 105 Stat. 1761 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter RTCIA].
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tion summarizes some of the principal features of the two acts and
highlights their effects on issues covered by this Article.2°9
1. FDIC and RTC Resources
The two acts increased the resources available to the FDIC insur-
ance funds210 and the RTC.2 11 FDICIA increased the borrowing au-
thority of the FDIC from $5 billion to $30 billion212 and mandated
recapitalization of the BIF under specified circumstances.213 RTCIA
authorized Treasury to provide an increase in funding to the RTC in
an amount not to exceed $25 billion. 14 RTICIA also terminated the
borrowing authority of the REFCO after the date of enactment of the
new legislation (December 12, 1991).215
2. Improved Supervision
FDICIA included a series of provisions intended to improve the
supervision of insured depository institutions. It adopted a general
rule requiring annual on-site examinations of all insured depository
institutions,2"6 effective one year after its enactment on December 19,
1991.217 In addition, the federal bank regulatory agencies, acting
through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, were
required to establish a "comparable examination improvement pro-
gram"218 meeting certain specified requirements. 219 As a general rule,
FDICIA also required independent audits of insured depository
institutions." 0
209. For analytical tables identifying the effects of the provisions of FDICIA on
existing codified law, and a chart identifying regulatory issuances intended to imple-
ment the FDICIA, see 1 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, figs.
1.17-1.19, at 1.280-1.362.
210. On the FDIC insurance funds, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
211. On the RTC, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
212. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a); see also id §§ 1817(b), 1824(c) (establishing re-
payment schedules for borrowing and permitting emergency assessments on insured
depository institutions); cf id. § 1825(c)(5)-(6) (limiting outstanding borrowing of
FDIC insurance funds).
213. IL § 1817(b)(1)(A), (C) (instituting assessment rate changes and establishing
rules for recapitalizing the BIF); see also id. § 1824(d) (establishing rules governing
borrowing for BIF from BIF members).
214. RTCIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(i)(3).
215. Id § 1441(e)(2).
216. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1)-(3). Certain specified small institutions (well-
capitalized and well-managed institutions with total assets of less than $100 million
with no recent change in control) are to be examined every 18 months. Id.
§ 1820(d)(4). But see id § 1820 note (providing transition rule); cfi CDRIA § 306
(easing annual examination rule for certain institutions).
217. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1820.
218. Id. § 1820(d)(1).
219. See id § 1820(d)(2).
220. Id § 1831m(a).
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Assessments to insured depository institutions were authorized to
cover the costs of conducting FDIC examinations.' In the case of an
institution's affiliate that refuses or fails to pay such an assessment, the
institution itself could be assessed such costs .z Civil money penalties
against the affiliate were also authorizedm3 Similar rules applied to
the Comptroller's examination and supervision of national banksz24
and to OTS examination and supervision of savings associations2 -
FDIC insurance of deposits of any depository institution now re-
quires a specific application to and approval by the FDIC.2 6 Specific
application and approval was not required, however, in the case of an
interim depository institution chartered by the appropriate federal
bank regulatory agency,z 7 a previously insured depository institution
whose insured status was continued under 12 U.S.C. § 1814,M a previ-
ously insured depository institution that was newly admitted to mem-
bership in the Federal Reserve System,2 9 or a previously insured state
bank that converted into a national bankO3 ° New rules also applied to
depository institutions that were not insured by the FDIC13'
FDICIA established specific accounting objectives, standards, and
requirements generally applicable to all insured depository institu-
tions.232 These included uniform standards for accounting of
capital.3
FDICIA generally required prompt regulatory action in terms of
"corrective action"'  intended to "resolve the problems of insured
depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to the de-
posit insurance fund." 35 Such action included the implementation of
221. Id § 1820(e).
222. Id. § 1820(e)(3).
223. IM § 1820(e)(4).
224. Id. §§ 481-482.
225. Id § 1467(a)-(b), (k).
226. Id. § 1815(a).
227. Id. § 1815(a)(2).
228. Id. § 1815(a)(3).
229. I § 1814(b).
230. Id.
231. See id. § 1831t (requiring, inter alia, annual independent audits of private de-
posit insurers).
232. Id. § 1831n.
233. Id. § 1831n(b).
234. Id § 1831o(a)(2).
235. Id. § 1831o(a)(1); see also FDIC, Statement of Policy on Assistance to Operat-
ing Insured Depository Institutions, reprinted in 57 Fed. Reg. 60,203 (1992) (covering
the FDIC policy concerning statutory cost test for FDIC-assisted resolutions and re-
quirements for FDIC assistance to operating institutions prior to appointment of con-
servator or receiver); cf. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4), (8), (11) (mandating least-
cost resolution of failing institution problems). On the principles of early resolution,
see FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1823; see also FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(D) (authoriz-
ing disallowance by receiver of secured claims in excess of collateral);12 U.S.C.
§§ 347a, 347b(a)-(b), (n) (limiting Federal Reserve discount window advances); 58
Fed. Reg. 68,509 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 201) (Fed implementing § 12 and
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capital standards. 2 6 Final regulations implementing these provisions
were to be promulgated not later than nine months after enactment of
FDICIA on December 19, 1991, 237 with an effective date not later
than one year after that date."3 A related provision amended the
conservatorship and receivership provisions of FDIA, 39 the National
Bank Act,24° the Bank Conservation Act,241 HOLA, a2 and the Fed-
eral Reserve Act243 to facilitate prompt regulatory action.
FDICIA also focused on the safety and soundness of insured depos-
itory institutions in several ways. It authorized federal bank regula-
tory agencies to impose more stringent treatment of capital of
institutions that were determined to be in an unsafe and unsound con-
dition or to be engaged in an unsafe and unsound practice.2a It also
required the creation by the federal bank regulatory agencies of de-
tailed standards for safety and soundness of insured depository institu-
tions and their holding companies, 2 4 in specified areas of concern
such as operational and managerial standards,246 asset quality, earn-
ings and stock valuation standards, 47 and compensation standards. 248
FDICIA also made one significant change in the federal deposit in-
surance system related to concerns over the supervision of depository
institutions. It required the establishment of a risk-based assessment
system for federal deposit insurance.249
As to the activities of depository institutions, FDICIA generally re-
quired, with certain specified exceptions, that insured state banks not
engage in any type of activity not permissible for national banks.2 11 It
revising rules to discourage advances to "undercapitalized" and "critically undercapi-
talized" depository institutions).
236. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)-(f), (h)-(i), (k), (n). These rules do not apply to
depository institutions in conservatorship, or to bridge banks the stock of which is
owned only by the FDIC or RTC. Id. § 1831o). FDICIA also contains provisions
requiring the periodic review and improvement of applicable capital standards. See
id. § 1828(p).
237. It § 1831o.
238. Id.; see, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 8210 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 303, 325)
(discussing the implementation of FDIC prompt corrective action rules).
239. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5), (9)-(13).
240. Id. § 191.
241. Id. § 203(a).
242. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(A)-(F).
243. Id. § 248(o).
244. Id § 1831o(g).
245. Id § 1831s; see 58 Fed. Reg. 60,802 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 30,
208, 225, 263, 303, 308, 364, 570) (listing OCC, Fed, FDIC, and OTS proposed rules
establishing safety and soundness standards).
246. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831s(a).
247. Id § 1831s(b).
248. Id § 1831s(c).
249. lId § 1817(b); see 58 Fed. Reg. 29,952 (1993) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330)
(listing FDIC insurance coverage rules).
250. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831a; see 12 C.F.R. pt. 303, amended by 58 Fed. Reg.
64,455 (1993). For the corresponding rules applicable to SAIF-insured savings as-
sociations, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 333, amended by 58 Fed. Reg. 64,460 (1993).
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also required the agencies to adopt uniform regulations restricting real
estate lending by prescribing standards for such extensions of credit in
accordance with certain general principles specified in the act.25 1
FDICIA also recodified the statutory provisions restricting extensions
of credit to insiders of depository institutions.' Existing transactions
were not affected by these new rules.3
3. Supervision of Failing Institutions
RTCIA made certain structural and substantive changes intended
to affect the supervision of failing institutions subject to RTC over-
sight. For example, the OTS was required to appoint the RTC as re-
ceiver for failed thrift institutions through September 30, 1993, rather
than the August 9, 1992, date specified in FIRREA.3S
The structure of the RTC was realigned. Among other things, the
RTC was now to be managed by its own chief executive officer, rather
than by the FDIC.255 A restructured Oversight Board, now officially
known as the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board,1 6 was
charged with the duty, inter alia, of "monitoring" rather than being
"accountable for" the RTC.257
4. Mergers and Acquisitions
FDICIA also contained a series of provisions amending certain stat-
utory rules with respect to mergers and acquisitions. FDICIA
amended the rule with respect to a five-year moratorium on conver-
sions previously imposed by FIRREA 58 FDICIA permitted conver-
sions meeting statutorily specified conditions to take place with the
prior written approval of the responsible agency.25 9
FDICIA authorized mergers, consolidations, and other acquisitions
by or involving savings associationsm° or national banks" with any
251. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o); see also id. § 371(a) (stating conforming amend-
ment to Federal Reserve Act).
252. Id. § 375b. Restrictions on transactions with affiliates and insiders apply to
insured nonmember banks as well as member banks. See id. § 1828(). Correspond-
ing rules apply to savings associations. See id. §§ 1468(b)(1), 1972(2)(H)(i).
253. Id. § 375b.
254. RTCIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)(ii).
255. Id. § 1441a(b)(8)(C). On other structural changes within the RTC, see id.
§ 1441a(b)(1)(C), (3)(B), (9)(A), (9)(C), (10)(E) (striking § 1441a(b)(8) and renum-
bering § 1441a(b)(9)-(14) as (8)-(13)).
256. Id. § 1441a(a)(1), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1994). On
restructuring the Oversight Board, see i § 1441a(a)(3)(A), (E).
257. Id § 1441a(a)(2). On other changes in the duties and authorities of the Over-
sight Board, see id. § 1441a(a)(6)(A)-(C), (8)(A), amended by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(a)(6), (8) (Supp. V 1994).
258. See FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(A).
259. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(3).
260. Id. § 1467a(t).
261. Id § 215c.
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other insured depository institution. Such transactions were made
generally subject to the approval or disapproval of the Director of the
OTS262 or the Comptroller of the Currency,2 63 respectively, within
sixty days of the filing of an application for approval of the
transaction.
III. DOUBLING UP: INTERSTATE BANKING
On September 29, 1994, President Clinton signed the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 ("IB-
BEA")264 into law. When fully effective, the provisions of IBBEA
will permit geographic expansion by banks without regard to artificial
barriers to interstate expansion heretofore imposed by the Douglas
Amendment 265 to the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA") 266 and
the branching provisions of state law and the National Bank Act
("NBA"). 267
A. Interstate Banking Through Holding Company Acquisition
Among other things, IBBEA permitted the acquisition of out-of-
state banks. These provisions, however, are limited in certain situa-
tions by state laws and regulations.
1. Amending the Douglas Amendment
Beginning one year after the enactment of IBBEA,268 the Fed is
authorized to approve BHCA applications for acquisition of control
269
of out-of-state banks2 70 "without regard to whether such transaction is
262. Id. § 1467a(s)(2).
263. Id § 215c(b)(1).
264. IBBEA, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108) Stat. 2338.
265. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988). On the Douglas Amendment, see 3 Malloy, Bank-
ing Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 8.23-.24.
266. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (Supp. V
1994).
267. See, e.g., id. § 36(c) (NBA provision limiting branching by national banks to
branching permitted to state banks in same state). See generally First Nat'l Bank in
Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (giving meaning of "branch" for purposes
of § 36(c)); First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966) (construing § 36(c)).
268. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 note (stating effective date provision).
269. "Acquisition of control" means "to acquire control of, or acquire all or sub-
stantially all of the assets of." See id § 1842(d)(1)(A).
270. "Out-of-state bank" means "a bank located in a State other than the home
State of [the acquiring] bank holding company." 1l; see also id. § 1841(o)(6) (IB-
BEA definition). For these purposes, IBBEA defines "home State" to mean:
(A) with respect to a national bank, the State in which the main office of the
bank is located;
(B) with respect to a State bank, the State by which the bank is chartered;
and
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prohibited under the law of any State."'" This authority is limited to
acquisitions by banks that are adequately capitalized and adequately
managed.27 Permitted "acquisitions" would include acquisition of a
de novo bank that was chartered for purposes of establishing a pres-
ence of the acquiring bank holding company within the target state.2'
Certain state law restrictions affecting interstate acquisitions will
continue to have effect. The Fed is generally not permitted to approve
an acquisition that would contravene applicable state statutory law re-
quiring a bank to be in existence for a minimum period of time before
acquisition.274 The Fed, however, may approve such an acquisition if
the target bank has been in existence for at least five years, notwith-
standing any longer minimum period specified under the statutory law
of the host state.2 75
State law requirements that a portion of the assets of a target bank
be held available for call by a state-sponsored housing entity remain
applicable to such acquisitions if four conditions are met. First, the
state law must not have the effect of discriminating against out-of-
state banks, BHCs, and their subsidiaries.276 Second, the state law
(C) with respect to a bank holding company, the State in which the total
deposits of all banking subsidiaries of such company are the largest on the
later of -
(i) July 1, 1966; or
(ii) the date on which the company becomes a bank holding company
under [the BHCA].
I& § 1841(o)(4)(A)-(C).
271. 1l § 1842(d)(1)(A).
272. Id For these purposes, the term "adequately capitalized" is defined to mean
"a level of capitalization [that] meets or exceeds all applicable Federal regulatory cap-
ital standards." Id. § 1841(o)(1). The term "adequately managed" is undefined by
IBBEA. On federal capital adequacy standards, see 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Reg-
ulation, supra note 1, § 5.97-.118.
273. See, e.g., IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(1)(A), (C) (acquisitions of "shell
banks" included within new rules).
274. Id § 1842(d)(1)(B)(i). For these purposes, a "shell" or "phantom" bank, cre-
ated to be controlled by the acquiring BHC and to receive an existing target bank, is
deemed to have been in existence for as long as the target bank has been. Id.
§ 1842(d)(1)(C).
275. Id § 1842(d)(1)(B)(i). For these purposes, IBBEA defines the term "host
state" to mean:
(A) with respect to a bank, a State, other than the home State of the bank,
in which the bank maintains, or seeks to establish and maintain, a branch;
and
(B) with respect to a bank holding company, a State, other than the home
State of the company, in which the company controls, or seeks to control, a
bank subsidiary.
Id. § 1841(o)(5). On the meaning of the term "home State," see supra note 270.
276. Id § 1842(d)(1)(D)(i). On the meaning of the term "out-of-State bank," see
supra note 270. The term "out-of-State bank holding company" is defined to mean
"with respect to any State, a bank holding company whose home State is another
State." Id. § 1841(o)(7). On the meaning of the term "home State," see supra note
270.
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must have been in effect prior to September 29, 1994.277 Third, the
FDIC has not made a determination that compliance with the state
law would result in an unacceptable risk to the BIF or SAIF.278
Fourth, the "appropriate Federal banking agency" 279 of the target
bank has not made a determination that compliance with the state law
would place the bank in an unsafe or unsound condition.280
In addition, certain nationwide and statewide concentration limits
apply to the newly authorized interstate BHC acquisitions. First, the
Fed is not permitted to approve an interstate acquisition if the appli-
cant2 1 controls, or would control upon consummation of the acquisi-
tion, more than ten percent of the total amount of deposits of insured
depository institutions in the United States.2 u Second, as to acquisi-
tions other than initial entry into the target state, the Fed is not per-
mitted to approve an acquisition if: (1) immediately before the
proposed acquisition, the applicant" 3 controls an insured depository
institution or any branch of such an institution in the home state of the
target bank, or in any host state in which the target bank maintains a
branch; and, (2) upon consummation of the proposed acquisition the
applicant would control thirty percent or more of the total amount of
deposits of insured depository institutions in any such state.284 The
nationwide and statewide concentration provisions do not affect the
277. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(1)(D)(ii).
278. Id. § 1842(d)(1)(D)(iii).
279. For these purposes, the term "appropriate Federal banking agency" has the
same meaning as in § 3 of FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q). IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(n).
For a discussion of the term, see 1 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1,
§ 1.28-.31.
280. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(1)(D)(iv).
281. For these purposes, the "applicant" would include all insured depository insti-
tutions that are affiliates of the applicant BHC. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(A).
282. Id. For these purposes, the term "deposit" has the same meaning as in § 3(l)
of FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(). 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(2)(E). See generally FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 429-32 (1986) (construing the term "deposit"
under § 1813(o). The term "insured depository institution" has the same meaning as
in § 3 of the FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(n). For a discus-
sion of the term "depository institution," see 1 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation,
supra note 1, § 1.6-.9.
283. For these purposes, the "applicant" would include any insured depository in-
stitution that is an affiliate of the applicant BHC. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1842(d)(2)(B)(i).
284. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); see id. § 1841(o)(3) (providing IBBEA definition of
"branch" for BHCA purposes). IBBEA provides certain exceptions to the statewide
concentration restriction. The acquisition will be permitted if there is state deposit
cap limitation (see infra note 287 and accompanying text) that permits a bank or BHC
and affiliates thereof to control a greater percentage of total deposits in the target
state. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(2)(D)(i). Alternatively, the acquisition will be permit-
ted if it is approved by the appropriate state bank supervisor of the host state and if
the applicable standard of approval does not have the effect of discriminating against
out-of-state banks, BHCs, and subsidiaries thereof. Ia. § 1842(d)(2)(D)(ii). The term
"state bank supervisor" has the same meaning as in § 3 of FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813. 12
U.S.C. § 1841(n).
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authority of any state to limit, by statute, regulation, or order, the per-
centage of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institu-
tions in the state held or controlled by a bank, BHC, and subsidiaries
thereof.285
2. Compliance with Other Laws
Approval of interstate acquisitions are fully subject to compliance
with the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA").3 The Fed must
also take into account the record of the applicant BHC in complying
with applicable state community reinvestment laws.3
Similarly, approval of interstate acquisitions are fully subject to ap-
plicable antitrust laws 88 The Fed must also take into account the
applicability of any similar state anticompetitive laws.2
3. Banks in Default or in Danger of Default
An exception exists for acquisitions of banks in default or in danger
of default.29° Notwithstanding the restrictions discussed above, the
Fed may approve an interstate acquisition of one or more banks in
default or in danger of default,2 91 or an interstate acquisition as to
which financial assistance is provided by the FDIC under section 13(c)
of FDIA.
2 9 2
4. General State Authority over BHCs
Prior to the enactment of IBBEA, the provisions of the BHCA gen-
erally did not affect the authority of states to regulate banks and
BHCs subject to their jurisdiction.293 Aside from the explicit limita-
tions on state authority contained in IBBEA, the BHCA not only con-
firms this authority, but also explicitly provides that nothing in the act
is to be construed as affecting the authority of states and their political
285. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(2)(C). These state deposit caps are given ef-
fect so long as they do not discriminate against out-of-state banks, BHCs, and subsidi-
aries thereoL Id.
286. Id § 1842(d)(3)(A); see id. §§ 2901-2905 (CRA requirements).
287. Id § 1842(d)(3)(B).
288. I- § 1842(d)(4)(A); cf. id. § 1841(o)(2) (providing IBBEA definition of "anti-
trust laws"). On the applicability of antitrust laws to banking enterprises, see 3 Mal-
loy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 9.2.4.
289. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(4)(B).
290. The terms "default" and "in danger of default" have the same meaning as in
§ 3 of FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813. IBBEA, 12 U.S.CkA. § 1841(n). For a discussion of
these concepts, see 3 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 11.1-3.
291. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(5)(A).
292. Id § 1842(d)(5)(B).
293. See 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1988) (containing pre-IBBEA BHCA provision and pre-
serving state authority). This section was redesignated by IBBEA § 101(b)(1), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1846(a).
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subdivisions to subject banks, BHCs, foreign banks, and affiliates
thereof to state taxation.294
B. Intracompany Agency Activities
Pre-IBBEA, questions sometimes arose under state law as to
whether or not a depository institution subsidiary of a BHC could un-
dertake transactions as an agent for an affiliate institution.295 IBBEA
seeks to resolve these questions as a natural extension of its authoriza-
tion of interstate acquisitions by BHCs.
A bank subsidiary is generally permitted to "receive deposits, re-
new time deposits, close loans, service loans, and receive payments on
loans and other obligations as an agent for a depository institution
affiliate." '296 A bank acting in this capacity "shall not be considered to
be a branch of the affiliate. ' '297 Any such agency relationship must be
consistent with safe and sound banking practices and all applicable
regulations of any appropriate federal banking agency.2 98
Similarly, an insured savings association that was an affiliate of a
bank on July 1, 1994, is permitted to act as agent for the bank, in the
same manner as an insured bank affiliate could act.29 The agency
activities, however, must be conducted only (1) in a state in which the
bank is not prohibited from operating a branch,300 and the savings
association maintained an office or branch and conducted business as
of July 1;301 or (2) in a state in which the bank is not expressly prohib-
ited from operating a branch under a state law prohibiting interstate
bank mergers, 3  and the savings association maintained a main office
294. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1846(b). This state authority is confirmed "to the extent that
such tax or tax method is otherwise permissible by or under the Constitution of the
United State or other Federal law." Id.; see also IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 note
(restating existing law with respect to state taxation of banking enterprises).
295. The issue might involve, for example, whether the institution was, in effect,
acting as a branch of its affiliate rather than simply as an agent. See, e.g., Commercial
Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86, 89-91 (8th Cir. 1971)
(discussing use of bank as functional branch of an affiliated bank); see also Regulation
of Banking, supra note 131, at 219-20 (discussing "group banking" as functional
equivalent of branching).
296. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(r)(1). The question may be raised whether the list of per-
mitted agency activities is intended to be exclusive. According to IBBEA, the list is
not to be construed as limiting the authority of the bank to act in such a capacity
"under any other provision of law." Id. § 1828(r)(4)(A).
297. Id. § 1828(r)(2). If, however, the bank acts in an agency capacity under an-
other provision of law (see infra note 298), IBBEA does not affect the question of
whether or not the bank so acting is to be considered a branch of the principal. Id.
§ 1828(r)(4)(B).
298. Id. § 1828(r)(5) (effective Sept. 29, 1994, and amending 12 U.S.C. § 1828).
299. IM. § 1828(r)(6).
300. Id. § 1828(r)(6)(A)(i).
301. Id. § 1828(r)(6)(A)(ii).
302. I& § 1828(r)(6)(B)(i); see id. § 1831u(a)(2) (allowing states to elect to prohibit
interstate merger transactions); see also infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text(discussing permitted state law prohibitions on interstate mergers under IBBEA).
2062 [Vol. 63
BANK REGULATORY POLICY
and conducted business as of July 1, 1994.303 Any such agency rela-
tionship must be consistent with safe and sound banking practices and
all applicable regulations of any appropriate federal banking
agency.3°4
Certain prohibitions apply to agency activities of depository institu-
tions. The institution may not conduct on an agency basis any activity
prohibited to it as principal under any applicable federal or state
law2 s0 By the same token, the institution, as principal, may not au-
thorize an agent to conduct any activity on its behalf that it is prohib-
ited from conducting under applicable federal or state law.306
C. Interstate Bank Mergers
In addition to allowing for the acquisition of out-of-state banks and
opening the door to certain agency activities of depository institutions,
recent developments have also eased the process of bank mergers,
subject to state law.
1. Bank-Bank Mergers
As of June 1, 1997, the responsible federal agencies are generally
permitted to approve interstate merger transactions under the Bank
Merger Act ("BMA") 30 7 between insured banks with different home
states, regardless of state law prohibitions.3 m This authority is subject
to the election by the home state of a merging bank to enact a law
expressly prohibiting merger transactions involving out-of-state
303. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(r)(6)(B)(ii).
304. Id. § 1828(r)(5).
305. Id. § 1828(r)(3)(A).
306. Id. § 1828(r)(3)(B).
307. Id. § 1828(c). For these purposes, the term "responsible agency" is defined to
mean "the agency determined in accordance with [12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)] with re-
spect to a merger transaction." Id § 183Iu(f)(10). That is, the responsible agency is
for these purposes: (1) with respect to a merger in which a national bank results, the
Comptroller of the Currency; (2) with respect to a merger in which a state member
bank results, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and, (3) with
respect to a merger in which an insured state nonmember bank results, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
In addition, for these purposes the term "interstate merger transaction" is defined
to mean "any merger transaction approved pursuant to [12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(1)]."
Id- § 1831u(f)(6). The term "merger transaction" is itself defined to have "the mean-
ing determined under [12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(3)]," id. § 1831u(f)(7), that is, a merger,
consolidation, or purchase of substantially all the assets of a target.
308. Id. § 1831u(a)(1). For these purposes, the term "home state" is defined to
mean:
(i) with respect to a national bank, the State in which the main office of the
bank is located; and
(ii) with respect to a State bank, the State by which the bank is chartered
Id. § 1831u(f)(4)(A)(i)-(ii). With respect to a BHC, "home state" has the meaning
ascribed to it in the BHCA, as amended by IBBEA. Id. § 1831u(f)(4)(B); see supra
note 272 (quoting BHCA definition).
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banks.3 9 Any such state law must be applicable to all out-of-state
banks.3 ° State election has no effect on merger transactions ap-
proved before the effective date of the state law. 311
The responsible federal agency is generally not permitted to ap-
prove an interstate merger that would contravene applicable state
statutory law requiring a bank to be in existence for a minimum pe-
riod of time before a merger.3 2 The agency, however, may approve
such a merger if the target bank has been in existence for at least five
years, notwithstanding any longer minimum period specified in the
statutory law of the host state.3 13
An interstate merger may be approved by the responsible federal
agency prior to June 1, 1997, if the home state of each bank involved
in the transaction has already elected to permit interstate mergers.314
The state law must apply equally to all out-of-state banks,315 and it
must expressly permit such transactions with all out-of-state banks. 316
In early merger situations, IBBEA permits the host state to impose
certain conditions on in-state branches of the resulting bank in an in-
terstate merger transaction. 1 7 Any such conditions must not have the
effect of discriminating against out-of-state banks, BHCs, or subsidiar-
ies thereof.318 Moreover, the imposition of conditions must not other-
309. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(a)(2)(A)(ii). For these purposes, the term "out-of-state
bank" is defined to mean "with respect to any State, a bank whose home State is
another State." Il § 1831u(f)(8). On the meaning of "home state" in this regard, see
supra note 270.
310. Id § 1831u(a)(2)(A)(i).
311. Id § 1831u(a)(2)(B).
312. Id § 1831u(a)(5)(A). For these purposes, a "shell" or "phantom" bank, cre-
ated to be controlled by the acquiring BHC and to receive an existing target bank, is
deemed to have been in existence for as long as the target bank has been. Id.
§ 1831u(a)(6).
313. Id § 1831u(a)(5)(B). For these purposes, the term "host state" is defined to
mean "a State, other than the home State of the bank, in which the bank maintains, or
seeks to establish and maintain, a branch." Id. § 1831u(f)(5). On the definition of
"home state" for these purposes, see supra note 308.
314. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(a)(3)(A).
315. ld § 1831u(a)(3)(A)(i).
316. Id § 1831u(a)(3)(A)(ii).
317. Id § 1831u(a)(3)(B). For purposes of the interstate merger transaction provi-
sions, the term "branch" is defined to mean a domestic branch only. Id. § 1831uf)(3).
The term "resulting bank" is defined to mean "a bank that has resulted from an inter-
state merger transaction under [12 U.S.C. § 1831u]." Id. § 1831u(f)(11).
318.. Id § 1831u(a)(3)(B)(i). For these purposes, the term "out-of-state bank hold-
ing company" is defined to mean "with respect to any State, a bank holding company
whose home State is another State." Id § 1831u(f)(9). On the meaning of "home
State" in this regard, see supra notes 270, 308. The restriction against discriminatory
conditions would not apply to a nationwide reciprocal treatment requirement. 12
U.S.C.A. § 1831u(a)(3)(B)(i).
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wise be preempted by federal law.319 Finally, any such conditions
must lapse after May 31, 1997.320
2. Bank Branch Mergers
An interstate merger transaction may involve the acquisition of a
branch 321 of an insured bank without the acquisition of the entire tar-
get bank.2  Such acquisitions will be permitted only if the law of the
state in which the target branch is located permits out-of-state banks
to acquire a branch without acquisition of the entire target bank. 2
3. Application and Approval Process
Any interstate merger involving insured depository institutions is
subject to the application and approval requirements of the BMA.Y
In addition, IBBEA requires compliance with certain state filing re-
quirements.325 Material failure to comply with these state filing re-
quirements bars approval of the BMA application.3 26 A bank that
files a BMA application for an interstate merger transaction must
comply with filing requirements of any host state of the resulting
bank, to the extent that the requirements do not have the effect of
discriminating against out-of-state banks, BHCs, or subsidiaries
thereof.327 The filing requirements must also be similar in effect to
any requirement imposed by the host state on out-of-state nonbanking
corporations engaging in business in the host state2-' In addition, the
applicant must submit a copy of the BMA application to the state
bank supervisor of the host state.329
In addition, certain nationwide and statewide concentration limits
will apply to interstate merger transactions, except for transactions in-
volving only affiliated banks.330 First, the responsible federal agency
is not permitted to approve an interstate merger transaction if the re-
319. Id § 1831u(a)(3)(B)(ii). On notice requirements for federal bank agency deci-
sions preempting state law, see id. § 43.
320. Id § 1831u(a)(3)(B)(iii).
321. Where an interstate transaction involves the acquisition of a branch of an in-
sured bank, without acquisition of the bank itself, the branch will be treated as an
insured bank, the home state of which is the state in which the branch is located. Id.
§ 1831u(a)(4)(B).
322. Id § 1831u(a)(4)(A).
323. Id
324. See id. § 1828(c)(2).
325. See id. § 1831u(b)(1).
326. Id. § 1831u(b)(1)(B).
327. Id. § 1831u(b)(1)(A)(i)(I).
328. Id § 1831u(b)(1)(A)(i)(fl). In other words, the filing requirement applicable
to the out-state-bank must essentially be similar to generally applicable corporate law
provisions requiring registration of foreign corporations doing business within the
state. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law art. 13 (McKinney 1986) (foreign corporations).
329. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(b)(1)(A)(ii).
330. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(E).
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suiting bank331 would control, upon consummation of the transaction,
more than ten percent of the total amount of deposits of insured de-
pository institutions in the United States.332 Second, as to transactions
other than initial entry into the host state, the agency is not permitted
to approve a transaction if (1) any bank involved in the transaction333
has a branch in any state in which any other bank involved in the
transaction has a branch,33 and (2) upon consummation of the pro-
posed transaction, the resulting bank would control thirty percent or
more of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions
in any such state.335 These nationwide and statewide concentration
provisions do not affect the authority of any state to limit, by statute,
regulation, or order, the percentage of the total amount of deposits of
insured depository institutions in the state held or controlled by a
bank, BHC, and subsidiaries thereof.336
Approval of an application for an interstate merger is subject to
specified considerations identified in IBBEA. First, if the merger
would give the resulting bank a branch or bank affiliate in a state in
which the acquiring bank previously had no branch or bank affiliate,
the responsible federal agency would be required to apply the CRA in
its consideration of the application.337 It would also be required to
take into account the most recent written CRA evaluation of any
bank that would be an affiliate of the resulting bank.338 The agency
must also take into account the record of any applicant bank in com-
plying with applicable state community reinvestment laws.339
Second, the responsible federal agency must take into account ade-
quacy of capital and management. The agency is permitted to ap-
prove an interstate merger transaction only if each bank involved is
adequately capitalized as of the date on which the application is
331. For these purposes, the "applicant" would include all insured depository insti-
tutions that are affiliates of the resulting bank. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(A).
332. I1.
333. For these purposes, the "bank" would include any insured depository institu-
tion that is an affiliate of the bank. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(B)(i).
334. Id.
335. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(B)(ii). IBBEA provides certain exceptions to this statewide
concentration restriction. The transaction will be permitted if there is state deposit
cap limitation (see infra note 336 and accompanying text) that permits a bank or BHC
and affiliates thereof to control a greater percentage of total deposits in the host state.
Id, § 1831u(b)(2)(D)(i). Alternatively, the transaction will be permitted if it is ap-
proved by the appropriate state bank supervisor of the host state and if the applicable
standard of approval does not have the effect of discriminating against out-of-state
banks, BHCs, and subsidiaries thereof. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(D)(ii).
336. Id. § 1831u(b)(2)(C). These state deposit caps are given effect so long as they
do not discriminate against out-of-state banks, BHCs, and subsidiaries thereof. Id.
337. I1 § 1831u(b)(3)(A).
338. Id. § 1831u(b)(3)(B).
339. I& § 1831u(b)(3)(C).
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ffled." It must also determine that the resulting bank will continue
to be adequately capitalized and adequately managed upon consum-
mation of the transaction.' 1
Third, interstate transactions remain fully subject to applicable anti-
trust laws.342 The agency must also take into account the applicability
of any similar state anticompetitive laws. 43
4. Banks in Default or in Danger of Default
A general exception exists for interstate merger transactions involv-
ing banks in default or in danger of default. Notwithstanding the re-
strictions discussed above,' the responsible federal agency may
approve an application for an interstate merger in which one or more
banks in default or in danger of default are involved, or as to which
financial assistance is provided by the FDIC under section 13(c) of
FDIA.3 "
5. Operations of Resulting Bank
If the interstate merger transaction is approved, the charters of all
banks involved, except for the resulting bank, must be surrendered,
upon request, to the federal or state chartering authority.' " Subject
to the approval of the appropriate federal banking agency, the result-
ing bank may retain and operate, as a main office or branch, any office
that any bank involved in the transaction was operating immediately
before the merger transaction. 7 In addition, after consummation of
the transaction the resulting bank is permitted to establish, acquire, or
340. Id. § 1831u(b)(4)(A). For these purposes, the term "adequately capitalized"
has the same meaning as in 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(B). See id. § 183lu(f)(1 (provid-
ing IBBEA definition of term).
341. Id. § 1831u(b)(4)(B).
342. Id. § 1831u(c)(2)(A); cf. id. § 1831u(f)(2) (defining "antitrust laws" for these
purposes). On the applicability of antitrust laws to banking enterprises, see 3 Malloy,
Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, § 9.2.4.
343. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(c)(2)(B).
344. Specifically, in these situations IBBEA waives the following requirements: (1)
state election to prohibit interstate merger transactions (see supra notes 311-12 and
accompanying text); (2) branch acquisition provisions (see supra notes 321-23 and ac-
companying text); (3) state law provisions concerning required minimum years of
existence prior to merger (see supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text); (4) compli-
ance with state filing requirements (see supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text);
(5) concentration limits (see supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text); (6) commu-
nity reinvestment compliance (see supra note 339 and accompanying text); and (7)
adequacy of capital and management (see supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text).
12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(e).
345. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(e); see also id. § 1823(c) (describing financial assistance
under FDIA).
346. Id. § 1831u(b)(5).
347. Id. § 1831u(d)(1). IBBEA, however, has required the federal banking agen-
cies to promulgate regulations, effective June 1, 1997, prohibiting any out-of-state
bank from using any authority to engage in interstate branching primarily for the
purpose of deposit production. Id. § 1835a.
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operate additional branches at any location where any involved bank
could have done so under federal or state law, if it had not been in-
volved in the transaction.348
6. Continuing State Authority
The interstate merger transaction provisions do not affect the au-
thority of any state or political subdivision thereof to adopt, apply, or
administer any tax or method of taxation to any bank, BHC, foreign
bank, or any affiliate thereof.3 49 The tax or tax method, however,
must be one that is otherwise permissible under the U.S. Constitution
or other federal law.350 In addition, in the case of an in-state branch
of an out-of-state bank resulting from an interstate merger transac-
tion, the value of the bank's shares may be subjected to any bank
shares tax of the host state or its political subdivisions, on a propor-
tional basis. 51
As to supervisory concerns, under IBBEA, the states retain the au-
thority to supervise, regulate, and examine their respective state-
chartered banks .35  Nor does IBBEA limit the right of a state to de-
termine the authority of its state-chartered banks to establish and
maintain branches. 53 A host state may also impose notification or
reporting requirements on branches of out-of-state banks.354
Furthermore, the interposition of IBBEA does not necessarily pre-
empt previously imposed conditions and commitments imposed on
out-of-state banks by host states. 5 If, in connection with approval of
a pre-IBBEA acquisition of a bank by an out-of-state BHC, the home
state of the target bank imposed conditions or the BHC made com-
mitments to the home state, the state may continue to enforce those
conditions or commitments.356 Indeed, the state may enforce the con-
ditions or commitments to the same extent even with respect to an
affiliated successor company that controls an in-state bank or branch
as a result of an interstate merger transaction.357
348. Id. § 1831u(d)(2).
349. Id. § 1831u(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 1811 note (restating existing law with re-
spect to state taxation of banking enterprises).
350. I& § 1831u(c)(1)(A).
351. I § 1831u(c)(1)(B).
352. Id. § 1831u(c)(3)(B). On the coordination of examination authority among
host and home states, see id. § 1820(h).
353. Id. § 1831u(c)(3)(A).
354. Idt § 1831u(c)(4). Such requirements must not discriminate against out-of-
state banks or BHCs. Id § 1831u(c)(4)(A). They may be subject to preemption by
federal laws other than the IBBEA on the same subject. See id. § 1831u(c)(4)(B)
(permitting states under IBBEA to impose notification and reporting requirements if
"not preempted by any Federal law").
355. See id. § 1831u(d)(3) (regarding rules governing prior conditions and commit-
ments). On notice requirements for federal bank agency decisions preempting state
law, see id. § 43.
356. Id § 1831u(d)(3)(A)-(B).
357. Id § 1831u(d)(3).
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7. Related Provisions Concerning Branches
One effect of the interstate merger transaction provisions will be to
create new interstate patterns of branch ownership and control. IB-
BEA therefore includes certain conforming amendments to other pro-
visions of federal law concerning branches.3 8
a. The National Bank Act
Domestic branching by national banks is governed by 12 U.S.C.
§ 36, a provision of the National Bank Act ("NBA"). IBBEA amends
this provision of the NBA in several respects.35 9
Under the amended section 36, a national bank that results from an
interstate merger transaction is permitted to maintain and operate a
branch in a host state, in accordance with the interstate merger trans-
action provisions.36 Effective June 1, 1997, a national bank generally
may acquire, establish, or operate a branch in a host state (including a
host state in which it already has a branch) only if authorized by the
amended section 36, the emergency acquisition provisions of FDIA, 31
or the new interstate merger transactions provision.36 If a national
bank relocates its main office from one state to another after May 31,
1997,363 the bank may retain and operate its branches within its for-
mer home state only to the extent that the bank would be authorized
to acquire, establish, or commence operation of a branch in such a
state.36
In general, any host state branch of an out-of-state national bank
will be subject to host state laws concerning community reinvestment,
consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate
branches to the same extent as a state-chartered bank would be. 36
358. See id. § 36(d)-(f).
359. See id. § 36(d)-(f) (redesignating former § 36(d)-(h) as § 36(h)-(O).
360. ld. § 36(d). IBBEA, however, has required the federal banking agencies to
promulgate regulations, effective June 1, 1997, prohibiting any out-of-state bank from
using any authority to engage in interstate branching primarily for the purpose of
deposit production. Id. § 1835a.
361. See id. § 1823(0, (k).
362. Id. § 36(e)(1).
363. Cf id§ 30(c) (coordinating NBA relocation provision with new § 36(e)(2)
governing retention of branches); see infra text at note 366 (discussing retention of
branch provision).
364. 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(e)(2). In determining whether the national bank would have
been authorized "to acquire, establish, or commence to operate" such a branch, the
provision contemplates a situation in which:
(A) the bank had no branches in the former home state [i.e., where it had
previously operated only a main office in the former home state]; or
(B) the branch resulted from either an interstate merger transaction under
section 1831u, or a transaction after May 31, 1997, pursuant to which the
bank received financial assistance from the FDIC under section 1823(c).
Id § 36(e)(2)(A)-(B).
365. Id. § 36(f)(1)(A). Enforcement of these state laws with respect to national
bank branches is the responsibility of the Comptroller of the Currency, not the appli-
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This rule, however, does not apply if federal law preempts the applica-
tion of any such state law to a national bank.366 The rule also does not
apply if the Comptroller of the Currency determines that application
of any such state law would have a discriminatory effect on the na-
tional bank branch, as compared to its effect on branches of state-
chartered banks.367 All other laws of the host state, except for the
application or administration of any tax or method of taxation,3 68 ap-
ply to the in-state branches of an out-of-state national bank to the
same extent such laws would apply if the the in-state branch were it-
self a national bank with its main office in the host state.369
b. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
FDIA has been amended to apply to branches of state nonmember
banks in host states rules that correspond to those applicable to
branches of national banks in host states.37 ° Thus, such state non-
member banks will be subject to corresponding exclusive rules with
respect to the acquisition, establishment, and operation of host state
branches, 371 retention of branches upon out-of-state relocation of the
main office,372 and applicability of host state law to the activities of
the in-state branch.37 In addition, FDIA has been amended to pro-
hibit an in-state branch of an out-of-state state nonmember bank from
conducting any activity that is not permissible for a state-chartered
bank in the host state.374
cable state authority. Id § 36(f)(1)(B). Thus, intrastate national bank branching
within the host state will presumably be subject to "reference over" to host state laws,
much as intrastate national bank branching within the home state is under 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(c).
366. Id § 36(f)(1)(A)(i). This provision does not affect the generally applicable
legal standards with respect to preemption of the application of state law to national
banks. Id § 36(f)(3). On notice requirements for federal bank agency decisions pre-
empting state law, see id. § 43.
367. Id § 36(f)(1)(A)(ii).
368. On the administration of host state tax law or method of taxation, see supra
notes 349-51 and accompanying text.
369. 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(0(2).
370. See id. §§ 1828(d)(3), 1831a(j).
371. Cf. supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(e)(1) (NBA provision) with § 1828(d)(3)(A) (cor-
responding FDIA provision applicable to state nonmember banks).
372. Cf supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(e)(2) (NBA provision) with § 1828(d)(3)(B) (applying cor-
responding FDIA provision to state nonmember banks).
373. Cf. supra note 367 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f)(1)(A) (NBA provision) with § 1831a(j)(1) (applying
corresponding FDIA provision to state nonmember banks). The limitations and ex-
ceptions applicable to in-state branches of out-of-state national banks, see supra notes
368-71 and accompanying text, have no corresponding provision in FDIA.
374. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831a(j)(2).
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c. The National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act
The National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act3 75 has been re-
vised in light of the interstate merger transaction provisions. It now
provides express authority for a consolidation or merger by a national
bank with an out-of-state bank 76 if the consolidation or merger is ap-
proved pursuant to the interstate merger transaction provisions. 3"
This authority is not available for any consolidation or merger before
June 1, 1997, unless the home state378 of each bank involved in the
transaction has an early interstate merger transaction provision.Y9
d. Home Owners' Loan Act
IBBEA amends HOLA8 0 to preserve state constitutional home-
stead provisions and to implement statutes that exempt the homestead
of any person from foreclosure or forced sale for the payment of debts
unrelated to the homestead property.38' This provision also applies to
post-IBBEA amendments to any state constitution or statutory provi-
sion in effect on the date of enactment of IBBEA. 3n
D. State "Opt-in" Provisions Permitting De Novo
Interstate Branching
IBBEA provisions previously discussed have the effect of permit-
ting interstate branching as an indirect effect of an interstate merger,
as a result of which the existing branches of an out-of-state target
bank would become the interstate branches of the resulting bank.
Other IBBEA provisions permit interstate branching directly, through
the establishment of de novo interstate branches.3a
375. See id. § 215, 215a-1.
376. For these purposes, the term "out-of-state bank" has the same meaning as in
12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(f)(8). Id. § 215a-1(c); see supra note 309 (discussing meaning of
term).
377. Id. § 215a-l(a).
378. For these purposes, the term "home state" has the same meaning as in Id.
§ 1831u(f)(4)(A)(i)-(ii). Id § 215a-1(c); see supra note 308 and accompanying text
(discussing meaning of term).
379. 12 U.S.C.A. § 215a-l(b); see id. § 1831u(a)(3) (providing state early interstate
merger transaction provision); see also supra notes 308-13 and accompanying text
(discussing provision).
380. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a(f) (redesignating former § 1462a(O-(i) as
§ 1462a(g)-U)).
381. Id § 1462a(f).
382. Id
383. Id. §§ 36(g), 1828(d)(4). On the coordination of examination authority with
respect to branches established under § 36(g) or § 1828(d)(4), see id. § 1820(h). 13-
BEA, however, has required the federal banking agencies to promulgate regulations,
effective June 1, 1997, prohibiting any out-of-state bank from using any authority to
engage in interstate branching primarily for the purpose of deposit production. Id.
§ 1835a.
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1. National Bank Branching
In general, the Comptroller of the Currency has the authority to
approve the establishment and operation of a de novo national bank
branch 384 in a state other than the home state 8s of the bank in which
the bank does not maintain a branch.8 6 This authority, however, is
available only if the host state 3 1 has in effect a law that applies
equally to all banks and that expressly permits all out-of-state banks
to establish de novo branches in the state.38
In addition, approval of a de novo interstate national bank branch is
subject to certain specified conditions. First, the application is subject
to the same requirements and conditions applicable to interstate
merger transactions concerning state filing requirements,38 9 coMmu-
nity reinvestment, 390 and adequacy of capital and management. 391
Second, as to each de novo interstate national bank branch that is
approved under this authority, the branch is subject to state and fed-
eral antitrust laws392 and limitations on the operation of additional
branches, 393 as such laws and limitations would apply to a branch re-
sulting from an interstate merger transaction.394
2. Insured State Nonmember Bank Branching
FDIA has been amended to authorize the FDIC to approve de
novo interstate branches of insured state nonmember banks, subject
384. For these purposes, the term "de novo branch" is defined to mean a national
bank branch that:
(i) is originally established by the national bank as a branch; and
(ii) does not become a branch of such bank as a result of-
(I) the acquisition by the bank of an insured depository institution or a
branch of an insured depository institution; or
(II) the conversion, merger, or consolidation of any such institution or
branch.
Id § 36(g)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
385. For these purposes, the term "home state" is defined to mean "the State in
which the main office of a national bank is located." Id. § 36(g)(3)(B).
386. Id. § 36(g)(1).
387. For these purposes, the term "host state" is defined to mean "with respect to a
bank, a State, other than the home State of the bank, in which the bank maintains, or
seeks to establish and maintain, a branch." Iat § 36(g)(3)(C).
388. Id. § 36(g)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
389. See id. § 1831u(b)(1); see also supra notes 327-31 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing state filing requirements).
390. See IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(b)(3); see also supra notes 339-41 and ac-
companying text (discussing community reinvestment requirements).
391. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(g)(2)(A); see id. § 1831u(b)(4); see also supra notes
342-43 (discussing adequacy of capital and management).
392. See IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(c); see also supra notes 342-43 and accompa-
nying text (discussing applicability of antitrust laws).
393. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831u(d)(2); see also supra note 350 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitations).
394. 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(g)(2)(B).
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to rules that correspond to those applicable to national banks.395
Thus, approval of such branches will be subject to corresponding rules
requiring a state "opt-in" statute expressly permitting such
branches.396 The branches will be subject to compliance with the re-
quirements and conditions applicable to interstate merger transactions
concerning state filing requirements, community reinvestment, and
adequacy of capital and management.39 State and federal antitrust
laws and limitations on the operation of additional branches will also
apply to the approved de novo interstate branch.398
E. Branching by Foreign Banks
Interstate banking has also been changed with respect to branching
by foreign banks. The policy of "national treatment"399 of foreign
banks has been constrained by stricter requirements under both
FDICIA and IBBEA.
1. Effect of the 1991 Amendments to the IBA
Federal policy with respect to branching by foreign banks has be-
come a controversial issue in recent years. The International Banking
Act of 1978 ("IBA")4°0 as originally enacted was intended to imple-
ment a policy of "national treatment" for foreign banks seeking entry
into the U.S. market. Following the BCCI scandal,4"' however, the
IBA was amended in several significant respects by FDICIA.4(n
FDICIA had several significant effects on international banking.
First, FDICIA affects the capital supervision rules applicable to for-
eign banks operating within the United States. FDICIA requires the
395. See id. § 1828(d)(4).
396. Cf. supra notes 386-88 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(g)(1) (NBA provision) with § 1828(d)(4)(A) (ap-
plying corresponding FDIA provision to de novo interstate branches of insured state
nonmember banks).
397. Cf supra notes 389-91 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(g)(1)(B), (2)(A) (NBA provision) with
§ 1828(d)(4)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (applying corresponding FDIA provision to de novo inter-
state branches of insured state nonmember banks.
398. Cf supra notes 392-94 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA provision).
Compare IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(g)(2)(B) (NBA provision) with
§ 1828(d)(4)(B)(ii) (applying corresponding FDIA provision to approved de novo in-
terstate branches of insured state nonmember banks).
399. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604, 606-07
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing the implications of the policy of national treatment under
the IBA), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984); see also Regulation of Banking, supra note
131, at 841-43 (discussing national treatment).
400. 12 U.S.C. § 3101.
401. See generally Raj K. Bhala, Foreign Bank Regulation after BCCI (1994) (dis-
cussing the BCCI scandal and its effect on U.S. regulation of international banking);
see also Daniel M. Laifer, Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of Interna-
tional Banking Post-BCCI, 60 Fordham L Rev. S467, S471-78 (1992) (discussing ef-
fects of FDICIA on U.S. regulation).
402. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 note.
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federal banking agencies to revise their risk-based capital standards
for insured depository institutions to ensure, among other things, that
these standards take account of interest-rate risk, concentration of
credit risk, and the risks of nontraditional activities.4"3 The agencies
are also required to discuss the development of comparable standards
with members of the supervisory committee of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements ("BIS"). 404
Second, FDICIA prohibited payments on foreign deposits in con-
nection with the resolution of bank failures. FDICIA prohibits the
agencies from making, directly or indirectly, any payment or providing
any financial assistance in connection with any insured depository in-
stitution that would have the direct or indirect effect of satisfying any
claim, in whole or in part, against the institution for its obligations on
foreign deposits. 40 5 This prohibition does not apply to "open bank
assistance" provided by the FDIC to an institution under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c). 40 6 Nor does the prohibition bar a Federal Reserve bank
from making advances or other extensions of credit consistent with
the Federal Reserve Act (so-called discount window lending).4"7
Third, FDICIA significantly altered the rules governing the estab-
lishment and operation of federal branches and agencies of foreign-
based banks. Under FDICIA, the Comptroller is required, in consid-
ering any application for approval of an initial federal branch or
agency, to include any condition imposed by the Fed as a condition for
the approval of the application.40 8 The Comptroller is also required to
coordinate examinations of such branches and agencies with examina-
tions conducted by the Fed, to the extent possible, to participate in
any simultaneous examinations of U.S. operations of foreign banks
requested by the Fed.40 9 Furthermore, in considering any application
403. IdL
404. IME § 1828 note. On the BIS and its capital adequacy standards, see Regulation
of Banking, supra note 131, at 844-45, 850-57. FDICIA also mandates a study and
congressional report by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Fed, in consultation
with the other federal bank agencies and the Attorney General, that would take into
account, among other things, differences in accounting and regulatory practices and
the difficulty of assuring that foreign banks meet U.S. capital and management stan-
dards and are adequately supervised. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 3102 note. In addition,
FDICIA mandated a study and congressional report by the Fed and the Secretary of
the Treasury analyzing the BIS capital standards, foreign regulatory capital standards
that apply to foreign banks conducting banking operations in the United States, and
the relationship of the BIS and foreign standards to risk-based capital and leverage
requirements for U.S. banks. 12 U.S.C. § 31050)(1). The report is also to establish
guidelines for adjustments to be used by the Fed in converting data on the capital of
these foreign banks to the equivalent risk-based capital and leverage requirements for
U.S. banks for the purpose of determining whether foreign bank capital levels are
equivalent to that imposed on U.S. banks. Id. § 31050)(2).
405. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831r(a).
406. Id § 1831r(b).
407. Id § 1831r(c).
408. Id § 3102(a)(2).
409. Id § 3102(b).
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to establish an additional federal branch or agency of a foreign-based
bank, the Comptroller is required to provide the Fed with notice and
opportunity for comment on the application.410
In this regard, the Fed's supervisory authority was expanded. For
the first time, the Fed was given authority (in addition to the Comp-
troller) to approve the establishment of any branch or agency or the
acquisition or control of any commercial lending company by a for-
eign-based bank.41' The Fed also has the authority, under specified
circumstances, to order the closing of any state-licensed office of a
foreign-based bank4 12 and to recommend to the Comptroller the ter-
mination of the license of any federally-licensed office of a foreign-
based bank.4 13 FDICIA also gave the Fed broad authority to examine
U.S. branches, agencies, and affiliates of foreign-based banks, whether
state or federally approved.414 Of considerable significance to the Eu-
ropean Community was the additional provision requiring special ex-
amination fees to be paid by foreign bank operations for examinations
conducted by the federal banking agencies.4'
Fourth, FDICIA imposed limitations on the powers of state-li-
censed branches and agencies of foreign banks. FDICIA prohibits a
state licensed branch or agency from engaging in any type of activity
that is not permissible for a federally licensed branch, unless the Fed
determines that the activity is consistent with sound banking practice,
and, in the case of an insured branch, the FDIC determines that the
activity would pose no significant risk to the deposit insurance fund.416
In addition, such branches and agencies are subject to the same limits
on lending to a single borrower that apply to federally licensed
branches and agencies.41 7
Fifth, FDICIA imposed new requirements on the establishment and
supervision of U.S. representative offices of foreign banks.418 Prior to
FDICIA, a foreign bank operating a representative office in the
United States was only required to register the office with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury.4 19 Under the FDICIA, establishment of a rep-
resentative office now requires prior approval of the Fed.420 The Fed
410. Id. § 3102(h)(2).
411. Id. § 3105(d)(1), (g).
412. Id § 3105(e)(1)-(4), (g).
413. hd § 3105(e)(5).
414. Ik § 3105(b)(1).
415. Id §§ 3105(c)(1)(D), 3107(c).
416. Id- § 3105(h)(1).
417. Id. § 3105(h)(2). In fact, FDICIA allows the Fed or the state supervisory au-
thority to impose more stringent restrictions than apply to federally licensed branches
and agencies. Id. § 3105(h)(3).
418. On the limited role and functions of representative offices, see Regulation of
Banking supra note 131, at 859.
419. 12 U.S.C. § 3107.
420. Id. § 3107(a). Compliance with any applicable state law requirements is still
required. Id. § 3107(d).
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also has the authority to examine representative offices421 and to ter-minate the activities of any representative office.422
Sixth, FDICIA sought to encourage greater cooperation with for-
eign supervisors. FDICIA explicitly authorizes disclosure of supervi-
sory information by the federal bank agencies to foreign bank
regulatory or supervisory authorities.4z
Seventh, FDICIA restricted retail deposit-taking by foreign banks.
To accept or maintain deposit accounts with balances of less than
$100,000, foreign banks are required to establish one or more U.S.
banking subsidiaries for that purpose and to obtain federal deposit
insurance for any such subsidiary.4z4 If the foreign bank had a U.S.
branch that was an insured branch prior to FDICIA, however, the
branch was permitted to continue to accept or maintain retail
deposits.425
Eighth, FDICIA created new penalties applicable specifically to
U.S. operations of foreign banks. FDICIA established authority for
civil money penalties (administrative fines) to be assessed against any
foreign bank, and any office or subsidiary of a foreign bank, that vio-
lates, and any individual who participates in a violation of, any provi-
sion of the IBA, or any regulation prescribed or order issued under
the act.426 In addition, FDICIA established criminal penalties for the
knowing violation of any provision of the IBA or any regulation or
order issued by a federal banking agency under the act, with the intent
to deceive, to gain financially, or to cause financial gain or loss to any
person.427
The increased burdens placed upon U.S. operations of foreign
banks by FDICIA provoked criticism 428 and exacerbated the uncer-
tainty over the question whether U.S. banking regulation was suffi-
421. Id. § 3107(c).
422. I& § 3107(b).
423. Id. § 3109(a).
424. Id. § 3104(d)(1). Thus, any foreign-based bank interested in the U.S. retail
deposit market must conduct its U.S. operations through a subsidiary. In this regard,
FDICIA also mandated a study and congressional report by the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Fed, in consultation with the other federal bank agencies and the
Attorney General, to determine whether foreign banks should be required to conduct
banking operations in the United States through subsidiaries rather than branches.
Id. § 3102 note. IBBEA amended this provision to indicate that insured banks in U.S.
territories are not subject to the retail deposit-taking rule. Id. § 3104(d)(3).
425. MBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3104(d)(2).
426. Id. § 3110.
427. Id. § 3111.
428. See, e.g., Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising the
International Banking Act of 1978, For the Worse?, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 537 (1992)
(criticizing FDICIA and other legislation which revised the IBA); see Bhala, supra
note 403, at 10.
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ciently reciprocal to allow entry by U.S. banks into the European
Union's Community-wide banking market.4 29
2. Effect of IBBEA on Interstate Operations of Foreign Banks
It is against this statutory background that IBBEA undertook to
amend the IBA. Two objectives may be discerned in the amendment:
dealing with the practical implications of the 1991 amendments to the
1BA430 and readjusting the IBA in light of the changes in interstate
banking and branching instituted by IBBEA itself.4 3 '
IBBEA amends the IBA rules governing interstate operations of
foreign banks.432 In general, it subjects the establishment of interstate
operations of a federal branch or agency of a foreign bank to the same
rules that would apply if the foreign bank were a national bank seek-
ing to branch interstate."33 Similarly, IBBEA subjects the establish-
ment of interstate operations of a state-licensed branch or agency of a
foreign bank to the same rules that would apply if the foreign bank
were a state bank seeking to branch interstate. 3' These rules are gen-
erally preemptive and exclusive. 35
Operation of any interstate branch or agency of a foreign bank is
subject to the same 1BBEA rules governing domestic branches of na-
tional and state banks resulting from interstate merger transactions. 36
429. See Regulation of Banking, supra note 131, at 869-70 (discussing the reciproc-
ity requirement).
430. See, e.g., IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3105 note (moratorium on examination fees
under § 3105(c)(1)(D)); cf. note 417 and accompanying text (discussing 1991 imposi-
tion of examination fees).
431. See, e.g., IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(1) (subjecting U.S. interstate branch-
ing and agency operations of foreign banks to the rules of 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g), 1831u).
432. For a discussion of the pre-IBBEA rules under the MEA for interstate opera-
tions of foreign banks, see Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d
604, 615-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984); see also Regulation of
Banking, supra note 131, at 904-19 (discussing Conference and § 3103).
433. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(1); cf supra notes 307-12, 384-94, and accom-
panying text (discussing interstate branching rules applicable to national banks). On
the criteria for determining approval of interstate operations of a foreign bank's fed-
eral branch or agency, see 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(3)(A)-(C).
434. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(2); cf supra notes 307-23, 395-98, and accompanying
text (discussing interstate branching rules applicable to state banks). On the criteria
for determining approval of interstate operations of a foreign bank's state branch or
agency, see 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(3)(A)-(C).
435. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(5), which provides: "Except as provided in this sec-
tion, a foreign bank may not, directly or indirectly, acquire, establish, or operate a
branch or agency in any State other than the home State of such bank." But see id.
§ 3103(a)(7)(A)-(B) (providing additional authority for interstate operations of for-
eign banks where a host state expressly permits the operations, and the branch de-
posit operations are limited to international or foreign-related deposits). On the
definition of "home State" for these purposes, see id. § 3103(a)(9). On the rules for
determining the home state of a foreign bank for purposes of the interstate branch
and agency rules of IBBEA, see id, § 3103(c)(1)-(2).
436. hd § 3103(a)(4); see supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text (discussing
rules governing operation of domestic interstate branches under § 1831u). In addi-
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An additional, potentially controversial requirement, however, may
apply to foreign banks. FDICIA required foreign banks entering the
U.S. retail deposit market to operate through a separately chartered
U.S. subsidiary rather than a direct branch." 7 IBBEA extends this
requirement, under certain specified circumstances, to interstate oper-
ations of any foreign bank.438 If the Fed or the Comptroller finds that,
in light of differing regulatory or accounting standards in a foreign
bank's home country, adherence by the bank to applicable U.S. capi-
tal requirements could only be verified if the foreign bank's U.S.
banking activities were carried out in a separate U.S. subsidiary, the
agencies4 39 have the authority to require that the foreign bank (or the
company controlling the foreign bank) establish a U.S. subsidiary to
carry out the interstate operations. 440 This provision potentially
moves the United States further away from the original policy of na-
tional treatment for foreign bank operations in the United States that
underlies the IBA.441 Because most members of the European Union
participate in the BIS capital adequacy guidelines, 442 the degree of po-
tential confrontation with our European allies in this regard may be
minimized. In addition, IBBEA grandfathers foreign bank operations
in place on the day before the enactment of IBBEA.443 Nevertheless,
tion, a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank is not permitted to manage, through a
managed or controlled office located outside the United States, any type of activity
not permitted to be managed by a domestic bank through a branch or subsidiary
located outside the United States. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3105(k)(1). This prohibition is effec-
tive 180 days after the enactment of IBBEA. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3105 note.
437. See supra notes 424-25 and accompanying text.
438. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(6). IBBEA, however, clarifies the impact of the new
rules in several respects. A foreign bank that has a U.S. bank subsidiary is still eligi-
ble to establish a direct federal or state branch or agency, in accordance with the
IBBEA rules. Id. § 3103(d)(1). Similarly, a U.S. bank that is a subsidiary of a foreign
bank with a direct federal or state branch or agency is itself still eligible to establish a
federal or state branch or agency, in accordance with IBBEA rules. Id. § 3103(d)(2).
439. If the foreign bank intended to carry out interstate branching or agency activi-
ties under a federal license, both the Fed and the Comptroller would have the author-
ity to make the finding. Id. § 3103(a)(6). If the foreign bank intended to carry out
interstate branching or agency activities under a state license, the Fed alone would
have the authority to make the finding. Id.
440. Id
441. This movement away from the policy of national treatment is underscored by
IBBEA provisions requiring the agencies to "pursue the objective of affording equal
competitive opportunities to foreign and United States banking organizations in their
United States operations, [and] ensurfing] that foreign banking organizations do not
receive an unfair competitive advantage over United States banking organizations."
Id. § 3104(a) (directive to Comptroller and FDIC under IBA as amended by IBBEA);
see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3104 note (requiring review of regulations by federal banking
agencies and revision of regulations under § 3104 to equalize competitive opportuni-
ties for U.S. and foreign banks). IBBEA also clarifies that domestic consumer protec-
tion laws apply to foreign banks with U.S. operations. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3106a(b)(1)(A),
(2)(A).
442. See Regulation of Banking, supra note 131, at 850-57 (discussing the BIS
guidelines).
443. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(b).
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depending upon the U.S. agency practice that emerges under this pro-
vision, the United States banking market may become significantly
less transparent to foreign banks.
It should be kept in mind, however, that IBBEA is not intended to
be a purely confrontational exercise with respect to foreign bank op-
erations in the United States. One salutary effect of the act is its mor-
atorium on the examination fee provisions included in the IBA by the
FDICIA amendments.'" During a three-year period beginning July
25, 1994, the examination fee provisions of FDICIA will not apply to
examinations of U.S. branches, agencies, or affiliates of foreign
banks,445 or to examinations of U.S. representative offices of foreign
banks.446
F. Increased Oversight of Community Involvement by Interstate
Banking Enterprises
An increasingly controversial issue in banking regulation is the de-
gree to which banking enterprises should be required to involve them-
selves in the economic well-being and development of local
communities served by their operations. Some of these concerns are
addressed by the recently enacted CDRIA. 4 7 Among other things,
the act is intended "to create a Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund to promote economic revitalization and community
development through investment in and assistance to Community De-
velopment Financial Institutions." 8 These private institutions will
focus on financial activities and transactions intended to promote
community development." 9 Such legislative efforts, however, are rel-
atively specialized, and they avoid rather than resolve the underlying
controversy. Namely, if banking enterprises enjoy a relatively exclu-
sive advantage in aggregating credit and lendable resources, to what
extent should they be required to serve their local communities? In
this regard, IBBEA presents a number of limited responses.
1. Branch Closures
It is not unreasonable to assume that, following an acquisition or
other transaction resulting in the creation of an interstate banking or
branching operation under IBBEA, the enterprise may consider con-
solidating or retrenching its operations to eliminate unnecessary or
unprofitable branches. What would be the effect on a low or moder-
444. See id. §§ 3105 note, 3107 note (Moratorium on Examination Fees Under this
Chapter). On the FDICIA amendment, see supra note 417 and accompanying text.
445. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3105 note.
446. Id. § 3107 note.
447. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4750.
448. Id. §§ 4703-4704, 4707-4708, 4712-4713.
449. See id. § 4702(5).
19951 2079
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ate income area45 ° served by such a branch? IBBEA subjects inter-
state banks451 to the branch closure notice requirements of FDIA. 5 2
If a person from the affected area submits a written request relating to
the closing to the appropriate federal banking agency, including a
statement of specific reasons for the request and a discussion of the
adverse effect of the closing on the availability of banking services in
the area,4 53 and "the agency concludes that the request is not frivo-
ous," 454 the agency is required to consult and meet with community
leaders and other appropriate parties "to explore the feasibility of ob-
taining adequate alternative facilities and services for the affected
area, including the establishment of a new branch by another deposi-
tory institution,... or the establishment of a community development
credit union, following the closing of the branch. 455
Whatever the outcome of this process of consultation, no action by
the agency affects the authority of the interstate bank to close the
branch, so long as the bank meets the generally applicable provisions
with respect to branch closure notice.456 This includes the bank's con-
trol over the timing of the closing.457
2. Credit Needs of Communities Served by Interstate
Banking Enterprises
IBBEA requires the federal banking agencies to promulgate imple-
menting regulations458 that would include guidelines intended to en-
sure that interstate branches of an out-of-state bank reasonably help
to meet the credit needs of the communities within the host state
where the branches are located.459 The regulations must also require
450. For these purposes, the term "low- or moderate-income area" means a census
tract for which the median family income is-
(i) less than 80% of the median family income for the metropolitan statisti-
cal area (as designated by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget) in which the census tract is located; or
(ii) in the case of a census tract which is not located in a metropolitan statis-
tical area, less than 80% of the median family income for the State in which
the census tract is located, as determined without taking into account family
income in metropolitan statistical areas in such State.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1831r-1(d)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
451. For these purposes, the term "interstate bank" is defined to mean "a bank
which maintains branches in more than 1 State." Id § 1831r-l(d)(4)(A).
452. IBBEA § 106, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831r-l(d)(1) (subjecting interstate banks to the
notice requirement of § 1831r-l(b)(2)).
453. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831r-1(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
454. Id § 1831r-l(d)(2)(B).
455. Id § 1831r-1(d)(2).
456. Id § 1831r-l(d)(3).
457. Id.
458. See supra note 347 (discussing the regulatory mandate).
459. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1835a(b). On the meaning of the term "host state" for
these purposes, see id § 1835a(e)(3). For these purposes, "out-of-state bank" in-
cludes a foreign bank whose U.S.-situs "home state" is other than the host state of the
branch. Id. § 1835a(e)(5).
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that, not later than one year after establishment or acquisition of an
interstate branch in a host state, the branch must be appreciably serv-
ing the credit needs of its local community. 060 If the appropriate fed-
eral banking agency determines that the bank's level of lending in the
host state 1 is less than half the average of total loans in the host
state relative to total deposits for all banks for which the interstate
bank's host state is the home state, the agency must then review the
loan portfolio of the bank to determine if it is reasonably helping to
meet the credit needs of the communities served in the host state.4
If the agency determines that the bank is not, it may order that the
interstate branch be closed, unless the bank provides reasonable as-
surances, to the agency's satisfaction, that it has an acceptable plan
reasonably to help the credit needs of the local community. 40 In ad-
dition, the bank is prohibited from opening any new interstate branch
in the host state, unless it provides such reasonable assurances.464
3. Community Reinvestment Act Concerns
The approaches taken by the CDRIA, by the interstate bank
branch closure requirements, and by the community credit needs pro-
visions represent relatively new responses to the problem of ensuring
community involvement by banking enterprises. The traditional re-
sponse has been to condition approval of bank regulatory applications
460. Id § 1835a(c)(1).
461. The level of lending is to be determined "from available information including
the agency's sampling of the bank's loan files during an examination or such data as is
otherwise available." Id.
462. Ik § 1835a(c)(1)(A). For the meaning of the term "home state" for these pur-
poses, see id § 1835a(e)(2). In making the determination whether the interstate bank
is reasonably helping to meet credit needs, the agency must consider the following
factors:
(A) whether the interstate branch or branches of the out-of-State bank were
formerly part of a failed or failing depository institution;
(B) whether the interstate branch was acquired under circumstances where
there was a low loan-to-deposit ratio because of the nature of the acquired
institution's business or loan portfolio;
(C) whether the interstate branch or branches of the out-of-State bank have
a higher concentration of commercial or credit card lending, trust services,
or other specialized activities;
(D) the ratings received by the out-of-State bank under the Community Re-
investment Act of 1977;
(E) economic conditions, including the level of loan demand, within the
communities served by the interstate branch or branches of the out-of-State
bank; and
(F) the safe and sound operation and condition of the out-of-State bank.
Id. § 1835a(c)(2)(A)-(F).
463. Id. § 1835a(c)(1)(B)(i). For the procedures applicable to the closing of an in-
terstate branch under these circumstances, see id. § 1835a(c)(3).
464. Id. § 1835a(c)(1)(B)(ii).
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on adequate performance by the applicant under the CRA.4 65 This
response has not been ignored or superseded by IBBEA.
a. Community Credit Needs and Foreign Bank Operations
IBBEA imposes a continuing requirement on foreign banks with
U.S. operations to meet community credit needs, after their initial en-
try by acquisition in the interstate market.4" If a foreign bank ac-
quires a U.S. bank or branch in a state where the foreign bank does
not maintain a branch, and the bank is a "regulated financial institu-
tion" under the CRA,4 67 the CRA continues to apply to each branch
of the foreign bank that results from the acquisition.4 68
b. CRA Evaluation of Banks with Interstate Branches
IBBEA also amends the CRA to provide specifically for CRA eval-
uation of banks with interstate branches.4 69 A bank with domestic
branches in two or more states must be evaluated by its federal regu-
lator under the CRA not only on its entire record of performance, 70
but also on a state-by-state basis,471 and on a separate basis, for each
multistate metropolitan area served by branches in different states
within the area.'
IV. DOUBLING BACK: CONCLUSIONS
At mid-decade, we have already seen the enactment of four major
pieces of bank regulatory legislation. FIRREA ushered us into the
nineties with a dramatic attempt to restructure a regulatory system
that had begun to collapse into itself after more than fifty years of
relatively successful operation. FDICIA attempted to stitch together
an interim solution to the problem that arose because the regulatory
system was still not adequately responsive to the challenges of life in
465. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1988 & Supp. 1993), amended by 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2903(a)-(b), 2906(a)-(c), 2907(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995).
466. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(8) (West Supp. 1995).
467. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2).
468. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(8)(A). This requirement does not apply to any
resulting branch that is limited to international- or foreign-related deposits. Id.
§ 3103(a)(8)(B).
469. Id § 2906(d)-(e).
470. See id § 2906(d)(1)(A).
471. Id § 2906(d)(1)(B). For the required content of such state-by-state evalua-
tions, see id § 2906(d)(3).
472. Id § 2906(d)(2); cf. id § 2906(b)(1)(B) (requiring separate presentations for
each metropolitan area in which a regulated depository institution maintains a domes-
tic branch). For these purposes, the term "metropolitan area" is defined to mean:
"any primary metropolitan statistical area, metropolitan statistical area, or consoli-
dated metropolitan statistical area, as defined by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, with a population of 250,000 or more, and any other area
designated as such by the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency." Id.
§ 2906(e)(2).
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an increasingly competitive, and increasingly internationalized, dec-
ade. CDRIA focused upon the counter trend that the decade's dy-
namic was neglecting the traditional goal of the regulatory system to
ensure access to credit for local communities. Finally, IBBEA has
sought to turn its attention to one of the perennial problems of bank
regulatory law and policy, the establishment of an interstate system of
banking. Obviously, many challenges are waiting to be met over the
remainder of the present decade and beyond.
One clear challenge is simply whether the latest bank regulatory
initiatives will be successful. Will CDRIA result in improved access to
credit by local communities? It has two potential vulnerabilities that
must be monitored. First, it relies on the incentive of federal funds to
encourage the creation of and to support the operations of community
development financial institutions. In a decade of challenging fiscal
constraints, this reliance may fail. Second, its centripetal objective,
the creation of a network of local-oriented credit institutions appears
to be contrary to the centrifugal forces of interstate and international
banking. A balance will be difficult to maintain, but such a balance is
probably essential for the maintenance of broad public confidence in
the banking system in this country.
Will IBBEA achieve its destiny, and create a viable system of inter-
state banking, without defeating the competing goal of maintaining
responsiveness to local community credit needs? The machinery ap-
pears to be available within the provisions of IBBEA to strike this
balance. It is also possible that the tension between these centripetal
and centrifugal forces could tear apart the system, resulting in a bank-
ing system that to some significant degree fails of these twin purposes
or dissipates broad public confidence in the system.
We must also be mindful of the fact that many equally significant
regulatory objectives remain as yet unaddressed or unfulfilled. Two
examples may suffice to illustrate the dimensions of the unresolved
issues outstanding. First, the regulation of bank securities and securi-
ties activities remains subject to a set of policy choices made over sixty
years ago, in the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act,47 3 the Securities
Act of 1933, 474 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 75 Proposals
473. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,78,377,378. See generally 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regu-
lation, supra note 1, § 7.2-2.4 (discussing the Glass-Steagall Act and its current
application).
474. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b-
77zzz (West Supp. 1995). See generally 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra
note 1, at §§ 5.2-5.2.4,5.3.3.1 (discussing the 1933 Act and current regulation of public
offerings by depository institutions).
475. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-ll1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-78111
(West Supp. 1995). See generally 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note
1, § 6.2-.2.6 (discussing the 1934 Act and its current application to depository
institutions).
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to reform and modernize this area of bank regulatory policy have fre-
quently been made 476 and just as frequently ignored or rebuffed.
Second, the problem of resolving the large pool of failed savings
associations, and the relatively modest pool of failed commercial
banks lingers, well past the enactment of provisions in FIRREA4 77
and FDICIA478 intended to address the problem. In this regard, the
most that IBBEA has directly contributed to this situation is a provi-
sion extending the viability of certain intentional tort claims involving
substantial loss to failed commercial banks479 or to failed savings as-
sociations4s0 now in conservatorship or receivership. It is a very real
possibility that failed depository institutions, like the poor, shall al-
ways be with us. The hope seems to be that we shall regulate our way
out of this dire situation, by creating a competitive market environ-
ment more conducive to growth and success for depository
institutions.
In a sense, we seem fated to continue without end to replay one
version or another of the fundamental controversy that flared up be-
tween Hamilton and Jefferson some two hundred years ago over the
proper role of the federal government in the regulation of the credit
function in the United States.48' One sees the reflection of this con-
troversy in the policy tensions within IBBEA, and between IBBEA
and CDRIA. On the one hand, with Hamilton, we seem to believe
476. See, e.g., 2 Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 1, §§ 5.4.1, 6.4-
.4.2 (discussing reform proposals).
477. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing FIRREA provisions
addressing resolution of failed depository institutions).
478. See supra notes 213-17, 216-20, and accompanying text (discussing FDICIA
provisions addressing resolution of failed depository institutions).
479. IBBEA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14)(C)(i)-(ii), which provides as follows:
(i) In General.-In the case of any tort claim described in clause (ii) for
which the statute of limitation applicable under State law with respect to
such claim has expired not more than 5 years before the appointment of the[FDIC] as conservator or receiver, the [FDIC] may bring an action as con-
servator or receiver on such claim without regard to the expiration of the
statute of limitation applicable under State law.
(ii) Claims Described.-A tort claim referred to in clause (i) is a claim aris-
ing from fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, or in-
tentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss to the institution.
Id.
480. Id. § 1441a(b)(14)(E), which provides as follows:
(E) Revival of Expired State Causes of Action -In the case of any tort
claim described in subparagraph (A)(ii) for which the statute of limitation
applicable under State law with respect to such claim has expired not more
than 5 years before the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or
receiver, the Corporation may bring an action as conservator or receiver on
such claim without regard to the expiration of the statute of limitation appli-
cable under State law.
Id-
481. See, e.g., Regulation of Banking, supra note 131, at 8-15 (excerpting and dis-
cussing the 1790-1791 exchange of views between Hamilton and Jefferson over the
establishment of the first Bank of the United States).
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that the economic well-being of the country is tied to the aggressive
and expansive development of the banking system, responsible for the
"augmentation of the active or productive capital of [the] country." 4"
On the other hand, with Jefferson, we seem to entertain a suspicion
that these matters are better left to local-oriented state banks, and
that "it does not follow, from [the] superior conveniency [of a system
of strong national banking],... that the world may not go on very well
without it."'  Perhaps inevitably, therefore, we persist in attempting
to maintain the precarious balance between the centrifugal necessity
of a competitive banking system and the centripetal demand for a
banking system responsive to local community credit needs.
482. Id. at 8.
483. Id. at 13.
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